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The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes, projects 
and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is 
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The Florence School of Regulation 
The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) was founded in 2004 as a partnership between the Council of the 
European Energy Regulators (CEER) and the European University Institute (EUI), and it works closely with 
the European Commission. The Florence School of Regulation, dealing with the main network industries, 
has developed a strong core of general regulatory topics and concepts as well as inter-sectoral discussion 
of regulatory practices and policies. 
 







The EU Clean Energy Package sets the EU energy efficiency and renewable energy ambitions for the 2030 
horizon. It also updates the rules that govern the functioning of the internal electricity market and the 
transmission and distribution grids. The package, proposed by the European Commission in November 
2016, includes 8 legislative proposals on the electricity market and consumers, Energy Efficiency and 
Energy Efficiency of buildings, Renewables & bioenergy sustainability as well as governance of the Energy 
Union. The Council agreed on its negotiating position for four legislative proposals of the EU Clean 
energy package in December 2017. For the different topics selected for this report, we will present the 
Commission proposals as well as the Council position included in the electricity Directive and Regulation. 
The positions of the different stakeholders of the EU electricity sector will also be stated at the end of each 
discussed topic.  
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The EU Clean Energy Package (CEP) includes a set of measures that the European Commission (EC) 
proposed in November 2016 to push forward the energy transition. The European Council published its 
agreed negotiating position on these proposals in December 20171. Currently, the Council, representing 
the EU Member States, the European Parliament (EP), representing EU citizens, and the European 
Commission are conducting ‘trilogue’ negotiations concerning the eight proposals (four Directives and 
four Regulations) included in the Package. The process is expected to be concluded before the next 
European Parliament elections in 2019. As the process is ongoing, the text starts from the European 
Commission proposals and their impact on the European internal electricity market rules compared to the 
framework established by the Third Energy Package, including the first generation of network codes.  
 
In this text, we will focus on two of the eight proposals in this course; the proposals for the Directive on 
common rules for the internal market in electricity (E-Directive) and the Regulation on the internal market 
for electricity (E-Regulation). 
 
The structure of this text follows the structure of the online course. The first section on Electricity Markets 
is ‘Ensuring the internal market level playing field’. The second section on Electricity Grids is ‘Adapting to 
the decentralisation of the power system’. The third, on the New deal is ‘Empowering customers and 
citizens’.  
  
                                                           
1The document can be found at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/public-register/ 
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1. Ensuring the internal market level playing field 
  
In this section, we first set the scene by introducing the different components of the typical electricity bill. 
We then focus on three key measures in the CEP proposals to ensure the level playing field in the internal 
electricity market, i.e., the phasing out of public intervention in setting electricity prices, the 
harmonisation of network tariffs, and the limitation of the use of capacity mechanisms. We conclude the 
section by highlighting the interlinkage of the CEP with the network codes (NC) on topics related to the 
internal electricity market such as bidding zones, balancing responsibilities, system operation regional 
governance and the calculation of interconnectors’ capacity. We also refer to the second generation of 
network codes that are included in the CEP proposals. 
1.1. Setting the scene: the different components of the electricity bill 
End-user electricity prices consist of the sum of three main components: the energy component, network 
charges and taxes and levies2 (T&L). The European average for the energy component is about 40% of the 
total bill for households. It declined by 15% from 2008 to 2015 as stated in (ACER and CEER, 2017). Note 
that for countries with a high share of renewable energy sources (RES) like Germany or Denmark3, the 
T&L, which include also RES contributions, constitute the main part of the electricity bill. Figure 1, gives an 
overview of the composition of end-user electricity prices across EU capital cities. 
 
 
Figure 1: End-user electricity prices breakdown of incumbents’ standard offers for households in EU capital cities – 
November–December 2016 (%), source: (ACER and CEER, 2017a) 
Electricity prices differ significantly across MSs for several non-market reasons. For households, they 
increased for non-market reasons at an average annual rate of 3.2% between 2008 and 2015 (ACER 2017). 
This increase is due to significant rises in non-contestable charges (network charges and T&L) in absolute 
terms (EC, 2016a), while the shares of network charges (%) in the electricity bill, as shown in Figure 2, have 
remained almost unchanged (ACER and CEER, 2017a). 
                                                           
2 Please take into account that RES subsidies are considered in this text as T&L. Indeed, RES are not a necessary cost for grids, 
however, they bring significant positive externalities for the environment and promote energy transition. 
3 In the case of Denmark, even though the share of renewable energies is expected to increase, this part of the bill will decline in 
the coming years, because costs for renewable energies are going to be gradually moved from the electricity bill to the national 




The energy component is determined by two main factors: wholesale prices and costs associated with the 
retail activity (EC, 2016b). There are three main drivers for wholesale electricity prices: fuel shares in the 
electricity generation mix, commodity prices, and market features (i.e., the degree of competition, access 
to resources, and regional market integration). Retail costs include supply operating costs (i.e., billing and 
marketing) and a profit margin for providing retail services4.  
 
The network component, including subcomponents of transmission and distribution, represented 28% of 
the EU electricity bill for households in EU capital cities (and Oslo) in 2016 as stated in (ACER, 2017). 
Distribution charges represented on average 23% of the EU electricity bill in 2016, while transmission 
charges represented 5% of households’ electricity bill in EU capital cities.  
 
 
Figure 2: Weighted EU average end-user electricity price components, data from (EC, 2016c) 
The T&L component has increased for electricity since 2008 as shown in Figure 2. This increase is mainly 
due to support mechanisms for electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E) and cogeneration or 
combined heat and power (CHP) across Europe5. The applied value-added taxes (VAT) on household 
electricity prices are percentages of these prices, including all other T&L (EC, 2016b). Therefore, VAT 
nominal effects increased with the increase of total prices. Some MSs additionally raised the VAT rate. 
Also, the tax rates for consumers vary across MSs depending on factors such as consumption and grid 
connection. 
1.2. Phasing out public interventions in electricity market prices 
In this part, we will start by providing an overview of the current practices for electricity price regulation. 
Then we present the proposed measures to phase out public interventions in setting electricity prices as 
well as the transitional measures aiming to ensure customers’ protection and a smooth phasing-out of 
regulated prices. Finally, we present the different stakeholder's positions on this matter. 
                                                           
4 Note that in some reports the energy component doesn’t include the retail costs. This would mean that the electricity bill wi ll 
contain four components (CRU, 2017).  
5 In some countries (Italy, for example) RES are paid by mean of a specific fee added to the electricity bill. Levies to remunerate 
RES are usually not included in the network component but rather in the T&L one to allow a comparison between different MSs. 
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1.2.1 Current practices 
In Europe, the majority of MSs have opted for retail liberalisation with non-regulated electricity market 
prices. Article 21 of the European Directive 2003/54/EC requires that non-household electricity consumers 
should be able to freely choose their supplier from 1 July 2004 and for household electricity consumers 
starting from 1 July 2007. Today, around 40% of Member states still have regulated end-user electricity 
prices, as presented in (ACER, 2017). Countries in eastern Europe as well as France, Spain and Portugal still 
have public interventions in setting electricity prices, either for the entire retail market or only for the 
household segment. EU countries practices in the matter of price regulation are shown in Figure 36.  
 
 
Figure 3: Application of regulated prices – households and industry, based on CEER National Indicators Database (2016) 
MSs have adopted different approaches with regard to retail competition following the European Directive 
2009/72/EC. Article 3(3) of this Directive states that ‘Member States shall ensure that all household 
customers, and (…) small enterprises, (…), enjoy universal service, that is, the right to be supplied with 
electricity of a specified quality within their territory at reasonable, easily and clearly comparable and 
transparent prices’. The directive adds in article 3(14) that ‘the interests of the Community include, inter 
alia, competition with regard to eligible customers’. This Directive was interpreted differently by MSs, and 
the degree of market liberalisation varies significantly between them; their reluctance to lose control over 
energy prices can explain this. Also, the introduction of a ‘supplier of last resort’7 has paved the way for 
adapting the Directive at national levels. 
 
According to the  EC (2015a), the phasing-out of regulated prices should be pursued with a mechanism 
protecting vulnerable consumers which is necessary to address energy poverty. This would preferably be 
provided ‘through the general welfare system. If provided through the energy market, it could be 
implemented through schemes such as a solidarity tariff or as a discount on energy bills.’  
                                                           
6 Please not that this figure indicates the countries that still offer regulated electricity prices regardless of their shares compared 
to competitive retail offers. For instance, in Portugal, 80% of electricity customers were under a liberalised tariff regime in January 
2018 (Baratti, 2018). Also in Denmark, the price-regulated supply obligations are being phased out according to (IEA, 2017). 
7 Article 3 of the Directive 2009/72/EC states that ‘to ensure the provision of universal service, Member States may appoint a 
supplier of last resort’. 
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1.2.2. Proposal for phasing out public intervention in electricity market prices  
The EC (2016d) encourages MSs to establish a roadmap for the phasing out of public interventions in 
electricity prices where such intervention still exists. The European Commission states in the E-Directive 
that ‘the new market design aims at ensuring competitive supply prices without public intervention, and 
only with duly justified exceptions.’ 
 
The newly added recital 15 of the E-Directive, on public authorities’ price regulation, emphasises the 
distorting effect of public interventions on price regulation. It states that ‘Member States should maintain 
a wide discretion to impose public service obligations on electricity undertakings in pursuing objectives of 
general economic interest. (…) Nevertheless, public service obligations in the form of supply price 
regulation constitute a fundamentally distortive measure that often leads to the accumulation of tariff 
deficits, limitation of consumer choice, (…).’ It adds that ‘a fully liberalised retail electricity market would 
stimulate price and non-price competition among existing suppliers and incentivise new market entries 
therefore improving consumers' choice and satisfaction.’ 
 
In article 5 of the E-Directive, the Commission proposes a gradual phasing-out of regulated electricity 
prices by the Member States, starting with prices below costs. MSs shall adopt appropriate measures to 
promote effective competition among electricity suppliers, which shall be able to freely set the electricity 
supply price. 
 
The European Council adds, in recital 15 of its position for the E-Directive (Council, 2017), more 
clarifications on the provisions to mitigate the distorting effects of public service obligations. It states that 
interventions in electricity supply price regulation must not lead to direct cross-subsidisation between 
different categories of consumers.  
1.2.3. Transitional measures for phasing out public intervention in electricity market 
prices  
The proposal for phasing out regulated prices includes retail market monitoring by MSs and at the same 
time allows a transitional price regulation blanket for vulnerable consumers and households in a situation 
of energy poverty.   
• Retail market monitoring for a smooth transition 
On the MSs monitoring role obligations, article 12 of the E-Directive promoting retail competition states 
that MSs shall ensure that ‘the right to switch suppliers is granted to customers in a non-discriminatory 
manner as regards cost, effort or time.’ Also, MSs shall ensure that ‘a customer wishing to change supplier, 
while respecting contractual conditions, is entitled to such change within three weeks8’. Additionally, MSs 
shall safeguard that ‘customers are not charged any switching-related fees.’ 
Derogations for contract termination fees, charged on customers willingly terminating fixed-term supply 
contracts before their maturity, can be given. According to article 12(3), ‘such fees may only be charged if 
customers receive a demonstrable advantage from these contracts. Also, such fees shall not exceed the 
direct economic loss to the supplier of the customer terminating the contract, including the cost of any 
bundled investments or services already provided to the customer as part of the contract.’ 
                                                           
8 The council adds that ‘by no later than 2025, the technical process of switching supplier shall take no longer than 24 hours and 
shall be possible on any working day, unless a Member State concludes there is a negative cost–benefit analysis’. 
6 
 
On retail offer comparison tools, article 14 of the E-Directive states that ‘Member States shall ensure that 
customers have access, free of charge9, to at least one tool comparing the offers of suppliers that meets 
the certification criteria set out in Annex I. The comparison tools may be operated by any entity, including 
private companies and public authorities or bodies. Customers should be informed of the availability of 
such tools.’ Moreover, the existence of ‘an independent competent authority responsible for certifying 
comparison tools and ensuring that certified comparison tools continue to meet the criteria set out in 
Annex I’, should be ensured by MSs. 
Article 59 of the E-Directive on ‘Duties and powers of the regulatory authority’ adds that NRAs have to 
monitor ‘the level and effectiveness of market opening and competition at wholesale and retail levels, 
including on electricity exchanges, prices for household customers including prepayment systems, 
switching rates, disconnection rates, (…).’ 
• Protective measures for energy-poor and vulnerable customers  
Regarding energy poverty, the E-Directive indicates, in its explanatory memorandum, that ‘Member States 
shall define a set of criteria for the purposes of measuring energy poverty.’ To support MSs, the 
Commission has launched the European Energy Poverty Observatory (EPOV), confirming the need for a 
common EU-wide effort to face energy poverty. For more information see Bouzarovski (2018). 
 
Also, the E-Directive adds, in its explanatory memorandum, that while the MSs are encouraged to phase 
out regulated prices, ‘vulnerable consumers can be protected by a transitional price regulation.’ MSs 
should also identify vulnerable consumers and put measures in place that give them adequate attention. 
The recital (4) of the E-Directive emphasises the protection of vulnerable consumers and states that ‘the 
Energy Union Framework Strategy sets out the vision of an Energy Union with citizens at its core, where 
citizens take ownership of the energy transition, (…) and where vulnerable consumers are protected’. 
Article 5 (2) of the E-Directive adds that ‘Member States shall ensure the protection of energy poor or 
vulnerable customers in a targeted manner by other means than public interventions in the price-setting 
for the supply of electricity.’  
                                                           
9 The Council proposes that this free of charge access should be ensured at least for household customers, and microenterprises 
with an expected yearly consumption of below 100,000 kWh. A microenterprise, according to article 2(5a) of the Council E-
Directive, means an enterprise which employs fewer than 10 persons and whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet 
total does not exceed EUR 2 million. 
 
The European Energy Poverty Observatory (EPOV) 
In December 2016, the European Commission launched the European Energy Poverty Observatory 
(EPOV), a 40-month research project that aims to improve the state of the art on energy poverty 
detection and the measures to tackle it. It aims also to support the EP Committee on Industry, 
Research and Energy (ITRE) evaluation of the related legislative proposals of the CEP. In the near future 
EPOV is expected to become a decision support tool for the new European energy policy and 
legislation. 
 
Maroš Šefčovič, Vice-President of the EC in charge of Energy Union, declared during the launch of EPOV 
that ‘the context in which energy poverty occurs varies greatly among our Member States. That is why 
we do not attempt to create a universal definition of energy poverty.’ Regarding this approach to 
identifying energy poverty he added that ‘at the same time, Member States will be the ones to define 
the criteria for measurement, and cost-effective solutions. We leave flexibility and leeway for each 
country to fine-tune it.’ 
7 
 
Public interventions in price setting for energy-poor or vulnerable household customers may continue to 
be applied by MSs ‘up to five years from the entry into force of this Directive’, according to article 5 (3) of 
the E-Directive. This option allows for transitional price regulation for vulnerable consumers. After five 
years, MSs, as indicated in article 5(4), ‘may still apply public interventions in the price-setting for the 
supply of electricity for vulnerable household customers in so far as it is strictly necessary for reasons of 
extreme urgency.’ 
 
In addition to that, MSs are obliged to monitor the number of households in energy poverty to provide 
targeted support. According to article 29, ‘Member States shall continuously monitor the number of 
households in energy poverty and shall report on the evolution of energy poverty and measures taken to 
prevent it to the Commission every two years as part of their Integrated National Energy and Climate 
Progress Reports in accordance with Article 21 of [Governance Regulation as proposed by COM(2016)759].’ 
The Council adds further clarification on the conditions for using public interventions in article 5(3b). On 
the derogation of the phasing out of regulated prices, the Council removes the five-year transitory 
deadline, introduced by the Commission, and links the public intervention to the support programme and 
the implementing documents [under the European Stability Mechanism10], (article 5 (3c) of the Council 
position). 
1.2.4. Stakeholders’ positions 
Regarding the Commission’s proposal, the joint statement by EURELECTRIC11, Wind Europe, Europex 12 
and EFET 13  (EURELECTRIC et al., 2018) states that ‘consumers will only be empowered through a 
combination of measures – such as efficient price signals, certified comparison tools and easy switching. 
Should retail prices continue to be regulated in some Member States, the benefits brought by the Clean 
Energy Package would be severely weakened.’ It adds that ‘retail price regulation is also a serious obstacle 
                                                           
10 The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is ‘an intergovernmental organisation located in Luxembourg City, which operates 
under public international law for all euro zone Member States having ratified a special ESM intergovernmental treaty.’ For more 
information, see www.esm.europa.eu/about-us.  
11 The Union of the Electricity Industry  
12 Association of European Energy Exchanges 
13 European Federation of Energy Traders 
Commission proposal 
• Main measures 
- Gradual removal of regulated end-user prices.  
- NRAs efforts are required to enhance retail markets competition, ensuring efficient competition and 
guaranteeing consumer protection. 
• Transitional measures 
- Price public interventions to protect vulnerable household customers may continue for up to five 
years after the entry into force of the E-Directive. Derogations for continuing price regulation after 
that exist. 
- A transitional price protection for vulnerable consumers can be set in the phasing out process. 
- MSs shall define sets of criteria for measuring energy poverty and report its evolution every two 
years. 
Council position 
- More clarification on provisions for using price regulation such as not leading to cross-subsidisation. 
- Removing the five-year deadline for phasing-out regulated electricity prices. 
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to competition among electricity supply companies. It reduces the incentive on companies to become more 
efficient, it discourages the emergence of new market participants and it stifles the development of value-
added services, including dynamic pricing.’ The four associations added that ‘other structural measures 
(i.e. direct payments, dedicated tax breaks, enhanced social policy and energy efficiency measures) should 
be promoted, instead of regulated prices, to ensure vulnerable consumers protection.’ They kindly request 
that the European Council and Parliament ‘make sure that the Electricity Directive enacts a clear process 
and timeline for the prompt phase-out of regulated prices.’ 
 
CEER also promotes the use of different policies to protect energy poor or vulnerable customers. CEER, 
(2017a) states that ‘targeted protection of energy poor or vulnerable customers can play an important 
policy role. However, this should not be based on regulated prices being below market price as this can 
damage retail competition and harm consumer welfare. Instead, vulnerable customers may benefit both 
from retail competition and targeted interventions where policy instruments are compatible with energy 
competition. For example, appropriate policy instruments including general social welfare system do not 
interfere with competition in the energy market while still allow for the protection of vulnerable 
customers.’ 
 
BEUC14 (2017a) policy paper states that ‘successive legislative initiatives have pushed Member States to 
create market places and break up monopolies. However, the process is far from complete and many 
markets lack of truly dynamic competition. Some consumers are suffering from significantly higher tariffs 
subsidising others.’ BEUC proposes to amend article 5 of the E-Directive as follows: ‘Where there is 
evidence that markets are failing, price intervention in the energy market should be permitted especially 
for specific tariffs (such as default tariffs). The price should be set at the level allowing an efficient supplier 
to make a reasonable level of return.’ It adds that ‘given that energy markets are in different stages of 
liberalisation, national policy makers and National Regulatory Authorities should pay particular attention 
when consumers switch from a regulated to a deregulated market, ensure a smooth transition and avoid 
bill shocks caused by unintended switch to a deregulated market.’ Additionally, on the protection of 
vulnerable consumers, BEUC states, with regards to article 5 and 28 of the E-Directive, that ‘Member 
States should define a set of criteria to measure energy poverty in the energy market, analyse if these 
consumers15 are sufficiently protected and add protections where needed, esp. in case of a deregulation 
process.’ It adds that customers’ disconnection ‘shall be prohibited until the dispute between the supplier 
and the customer is settled’ and that ‘Member States should establish rules for protection of customers 
who are indebted (such as by establishing deposit limits) and rule out disconnections during the winter 
time.’ 
1.3. Harmonising network tariffs  
In this part, we first present the current practices for network tariffs across Europe. Then, we describe the 
CEP proposal for harmonising them and the different stakeholders’ positions. 
1.3.1. Current practices  
Transmission tariffs design across Europe 
In Europe, there are different systems of electricity transmission pricing and associated tariff structures. 
Transmission access is generally charged via capacity component and/or energy (volumetric) component. 
Also, transmission tariffs can be applied to electricity generators and consumers, or in some cases only to 
the consumers. Figure 4 shows the differences across Europe based on ENTSO-E data.  
                                                           
14 The European Consumer Organisation, from the French name Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs 




Figure 4: Status quo on energy and capacity transmission tariffs components among MSs, based on (ENTSO-E, 2017a) 
The current situation is the result of nationally established transmission tariff policies and different 
national contexts. Some MSs (i.e., Germany, the UK, and Sweden) have implemented a capacity-based 
tariff whereas some other MSs (i.e., France, Spain and Italy) have implemented an energy-based tariff. In 
some tariff designs, system ancillary service costs and network losses costs can be charged through 
transmission tariffs (partially or totally) (such as Austria and France (ENTSO-E, 2017a)), rather than through 
market mechanisms (such as Spain and Portugal). Another difference between TSO charges in the EU is 
the share between generation (G-charge) and load (L-Charge) network charges as well as the seasonal and 
locational differentiation. This implies a certain complexity at the EU level.  
Distribution tariffs design across Europe 
The methodologies and structures for distribution tariffs are also different across Europe. As with 
transmission tariffs, the shares of energy/capacity components for distribution tariffs, shown in Figure 5, 
vary significantly across EU countries. Most European DSOs’ revenue is currently based on volumetric 
tariffs, i.e., 69% of the revenue for households, 54% for small industrial consumers and 58% for large 
industrial consumers. For more details please refer to EC (2016e).  
 




Interesting cases are the Netherlands and Great Britain (GB). In the Netherlands the distribution tariff has 
been based on the capacity of the connection of the household to the local feeder since 2009 and there 
is no energy component in the tariff. In GB, part of the network charges paid are intended to reflect the 
consumers’ contribution to the system peak. For more information, please consult CEER (2017b) 
guidelines of good practice for electricity distribution network tariffs. 
1.3.2. Proposal for harmonising network tariffs 
The CEP brings new measures for distribution tariffs harmonisation and links them to the transmission 
tariffs harmonisation process.  
  
Article 16 of the Commission proposal for the E-Regulation indicates that ‘tariffs shall grant appropriate 
incentives to transmission and distribution system operators, over both the short and long term, to increase 
efficiencies, including energy efficiency, foster market integration and security of supply, and support 
investments and the related research activities.’ It adds that three months after the entry into force of the 
Regulation, ACER shall provide a recommendation addressed to NRAs on the progressive convergence of 
transmission and distribution tariff methodologies as stated in article 16(9). ‘The recommendation shall 
address at least: 
(a) the ratio of tariffs applied to producers and to consumers; 
(b) the costs to be recovered by tariffs; 
(c) time differentiated network tariffs; 
(d) locational signals; 
(e) the relationship between transmission and distribution tariffs, including principles relating to non-
discrimination; 
(f) methods to ensure transparency in the setting and structure of tariffs; 
(g) groups of network users subject to tariffs, including tariff exemptions.’ 
 
On this proposal, the Council position has introduced a best practice report on tariff methodologies that 
should be issued by ACER, instead of the ACER recommendation proposed by the Commission. The report 
should address the same points proposed by the Commission in article 16(9). The Council adds that ACER 
shall update its report at least once every two years. This measure aims to leave sufficient room for MSs 
to take into account national specificities. 
 
For the implementation of harmonised network tariffs, the Commission proposes that this issue should 
be handled through network codes as indicated in article 55(1)(k) of the E-Regulation. Indeed, it adds the 
harmonisation of distribution tariffs in the areas to be covered by network codes next to the transmission 
tariffs ones.  The Council position on the E-Regulation, however, has removed the addition of the 
harmonisation of distribution tariffs from the same article. 
 
It should be noted that the harmonisation of transmission tariffs has been first introduced in the 
Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the third energy package (article 8) in the focus areas of network codes. 
However, this focus area has not been developed in a tariff network code16 so far. 
 
                                                           





1.3.3. Stakeholders’ positions  
EURELECTRIC agrees, in its position paper on the E-Regulation (EURELECTRIC, 2017a), with ‘the provision 
stating that ACER should provide a recommendation assessing the need for progressive convergence of 
transmission and distribution tariff structures. We also believe that such recommendation should provide 
guidance to NRAs to ensure a homogeneous implementation of the high-level principles listed under Art. 
16. However, it seems unrealistic to foresee only 3 months for ACER to issue such recommendation based 
on sufficient stakeholders’ involvement.’ 
 
CEER (2017b) welcomes, in its white paper on distribution and transmission network tariffs and incentives, 
‘the proposals in the Clean Energy Package requiring network tariffs that are cost reflective and which give 
appropriate incentives to increase the efficient use of the networks. However, CEER considers that 
harmonisation of both transmission and distribution tariffs at European level could be inefficient and not 
lead to the right outcomes for European consumers. Similarly, providing the appropriate incentives for 
efficient network use is complex and varies based on the regulatory framework and the characteristics of 
the industry in each Member State. The diversity in DSOs and their sheer number across the EU mean that 
National Regulatory Authorities are best placed to consider the best regulatory choices within the 
European framework. Implementing a ‘one size fits all’ approach risks inefficient incentives for network 
use on a Member State level, particularly with the emergence of more local energy models.’ 
 
EDSO, (2017a), amendments of the E-Regulation state that an ‘EU-wide harmonisation of network tariffs 
is not merited’. While EDSO supports the E-Regulation’s proposal that ‘tariffs need to incentivise network 
users to adapt their behaviour in such a way that it overcomes local congestion and constraints, and 
unnecessary costs where possible’, it states that ‘the diversity of distribution tariffs across member states 
implies that any future implementation can be best addressed at the national level. Therefore, EDSO 
cautions against any EU-wide harmonisation of network tariff systems’. It adds that ‘network and 
geographical characteristics are very diverse throughout Europe, leading to diverging best practices in 
terms of network tariffs structures. Network codes do not seem to be the right tool to efficiently enhance 
distribution tariff structures at European level.’ 
 
Commission proposal 
-Tariffs shall give appropriate incentives to TSOs and DSOs to foster market integration and security of 
supply (SoS) as well as to increase efficiencies and support investment and R&D. 
- Distribution tariffs harmonisation should be covered by network codes focus areas in addition to the 
transmission tariffs ones. 
-Harmonising national policies/ methodologies concerning the principles for distribution tariffs. 
-ACER is responsible for providing a recommendation on the progressive convergence of transmission 
and distribution tariff methodologies to NRAs. 
-NRAs should consider ACER recommendation when approving or fixing transmission tariffs or their 
methodologies. 
Council Position 
-The harmonisation of distribution tariffs in network codes was removed. 
-ACER shall provide a best practice report transmission and distribution tariff methodologies instead 
of the recommendation. 
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On network charges, REScoop states in its position paper ‘What local energy communities need from the 
Clean Energy Package’ (REScoop, 2017a), that ‘the market design should require distribution tariffs and 
compensation to reward smart behaviour and incentivise investments from citizens and communities that 
benefit both themselves and the system in the long term. Furthermore, national regulators should have a 
duty to ensure that network tariffs for distributed energy resources are calculated according to an objective 
and transparent long-term cost benefit analysis that takes into account their wide range of benefits to the 
energy system, society and the environment. At the very least, distribution tariffs should be required to 
promote flexibility in order to optimise when renewables self-consumers and energy communities feed into 
or draw out of the grid.’ 
 
BEUC, (2018a) policy recommendations state that ‘the Clean Energy for All Europeans package should keep 
the National Regulatory Authority as the independent body setting tariffs. National Regulatory Authorities 
should be obliged to make the methods and cost components used for the calculation of the network 
charges publicly available.’ It adds that ‘National Regulatory Authorities should redesign tariffs for all 
consumers, so that they reflect the costs and benefits to the system and the real use of the grid. The revision 
should apply to all consumers, and avoid exemptions for heavy industry. New tariffs should not unduly 
increase the financial burden for households, for example for those with a low level of consumption or 
living in remote areas.’ Also, BEUC adds that ‘Member States should be allowed to use net metering in a 
transitional period.’ 
1.4. Limiting the use of capacity mechanisms  
In this part, we will start by describing the current practices on capacity mechanisms’ (CMs) use in Europe 
and the CEP proposals to limit their use, discrimination against emerging business, their impact on climate 
goals and the related cross-border concerns. Finally, we will present the different stakeholders’ positions. 
1.4.1. Current practices in capacity mechanisms 
During recent years, some EU Member States have decided to implement different CMs (see Figure 6). In 
February 2018, six capacity mechanisms, also called capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRMs), were 
approved by the EC, under EU State aid rules, in Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Poland, (EC, 
2018a). The Commission found that those measures will contribute to ensuring SoS while preserving 
competition in the single market. The approved mechanisms are the following: strategic reserves, 
in Belgium and Germany, two market-wide capacity mechanisms in Italy and Poland, as well as a demand 
response17 (DR) tender in France and an interruptibility scheme in Greece18. 
 
Currently, the most common capacity mechanism is strategic reserve (EC, 2016f). This kind of mechanism 
is used in Belgium, Germany, Poland, Sweden, and Finland. In Germany, for instance, the strategic reserve 
mechanism requires network operators to procure and hold 2GW of capacity outside the market, starting 
in winter 2018/2019 and lasting initially for two years (BMWi, 2018). For Italy, a reliability option scheme 
is planned for 2019. The procurement of capacity, in this scheme, will be through competitive tenders for 
reliability option contract.  
 
 
                                                           
17 DR operators can choose either between a certification of DR as capacity or a reduction of consumption as supplier obligation. 
18 ‘Interruptibility schemes’ are mechanisms ‘in which industrial customers are asked by the network operator to reduce their 
demand in scarcity situations, are also considered a form of "reserve", as they provide capacity that is only activated when a supply 




Figure 6: CM implementation in Europe 
 
In Figure 7 below, the classification of CRMs is shown according to their characteristics, based on  ACER 




Figure 7: Taxonomy of capacity mechanisms 
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• In the volume-based schemes, the total amount of capacity required is determined in advance by 
policymakers or by a designated entity, i.e. a TSO. A market-based process is then used to establish the 
price to be paid. They are divided into market-wide mechanisms which provide support to all market 
participants that are required to meet the reliability standard and they, in principle, reward all capacity 
providers. On the other hand, targeted mechanisms reward only specific plants or technologies, i.e. they 
provide support only to the extra capacity required in addition to that provided by the market without the 
subsidies. 
 
• In the price-based schemes, a price is set by policymakers at a level calculated to achieve investment in 
the amount of capacity required. The investors decide how much they are willing to invest for the given 
price. 
 
The box below gives a description of the different capacity mechanisms19 used in Europe (EP, 2017). 
 
1.4.2. Current practices in adequacy assessments 
Many MSs have not adequately established their appropriate level of SoS before applying a CM. Table 1, 
based on replies to the sector inquiry, shows the methods of assessing resource adequacy among MSs20. 
These methods vary widely, making a comparison between them difficult. This view is supported by EC 
(2016g) sector inquiry report which state that ‘many resource adequacy assessments take a purely 
                                                           
19 For more details on the different uses of capacity mechanisms, please see ACER (2013), Hancher et al. (2015) and EC (2016g). 
20  There were eleven markets under this assessment: Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain and Sweden (EC, 2016h).  
Box: Description of the different capacity mechanisms 
Capacity obligation (CO): It is an obligation on suppliers or large consumers to contract with 
generators for a certain level of capacity. This capacity is determined by TSO/regulator and related to 
their self-assessed future (e.g. three years ahead) consumption or supply, plus a reserve margin. If not 
enough capacity is contracted, the supplier or consumer will pay a buy-out price/fine. The price for 
capacity is determined in a decentralised way, through the contracts; this model could also include a 
market of exchangeable obligations (secondary market).  
Capacity auction (CA): The capacity volume to be auctioned is decided centrally (by the TSO or 
regulator) a few years in advance. The price is determined by auction and is paid to all resources 
(existing and new) clearing the auction. Capacity providers bid to receive a payment that reflects the 
cost of building new capacity. The new capacity participates in the energy-only market. 
Reliability options (RO): RO is based on a forward auction (e.g. three years ahead). A capacity provider 
enters into an option contract with a counterparty (a TSO or a large consumer or supplier). The 
contract offers the counterparty the option to procure electricity at a predetermined strike price. The 
capacity provider must be available to the system operator for dispatch above the strike price. 
Strategic reserve (SR): A central agency (transmission system operator or government agency) decides 
upon the amount of capacity needed to make up any shortfall in the market few years in advance. The 
level of payment of the contracted capacity (strategic reserve) is set through a competitive tendering 
process. The contracted power plants cannot participate in the electricity market and are only 
activated in case of extreme conditions.  
Capacity Payments (CP): CP is a price-based mechanism. It pays a fixed amount (set by the regulator) 
for available capacity to all generators. The plants receiving capacity payments continue to participate 
in the energy-only market. The payment could be given also when the plant does not run, but certain 
availability criteria have to be met. 
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national perspective and may substantially differ depending on the underlying assumptions made and the 
extent to which foreign capacities as well as demand side flexibility are taken into account.’  
 
For adequacy assessment methods, there are deterministic approaches that compare the sum of all 
generation capacities with the peak demand for a single one-off moment. On the other hand, there are 
probabilistic models that consider a wide range of variables and assess their behaviour under different 
scenarios. The probabilistic approach is gradually replacing the deterministic one in some MSs as 
electricity systems are becoming more complex. 
Table 1: Probabilistic Vs Deterministic approaches to adequacy assessments, source: (EC, 2016h) 
 
 
The level of capacity needed to ensure SoS is expressed by the reliability standards. There are different 
metrics used across MSs to set reliability standards depending on the adopted adequacy assessment 
approach. Each one of them represents a way of measuring SoS based on consumers' willingness to pay.  
 
Deterministic approaches assess the generation adequacy level via the capacity margin, which is the 
relation between peak demand and the reliably available supply, as a percentage 21 . This approach, 
however, does not give a reliable picture of the adequacy situation due to the increase in renewable 
energies in electricity systems. Probabilistic approaches consider variations in demand over the years. In 
the probabilistic approach, generation adequacy can be measured through the calculation of the loss of 
load probability (LOLP), ‘which quantifies the probability of a given level of unmet demand over a certain 
period of time.’ In many cases LOLP is expressed as a loss of load expectation (LOLE) representing the 
number of hours per annum in which, over the long-term, supply is statistically expected not to meet 
demand (EC, 2016h). Both LOLP and LOLE, however, do not measure the shortfall in capacity that arises 
when there are disconnections, and neither LOLP/LOLE nor capacity margins can measure the unmet 
demand. This would require a measurement of expected energy not served (EENS), which represents the 
amount of electricity demand (in MWh) that is expected not to be met by generation for a given year. 
Note that to obtain the economic value of adequacy, it is necessary to quantify the Value of Lost Load 
(VOLL). As the name suggests, VOLL measures the damage suffered by consumers when the supply is 
curtailed22. It is crucial to implement a cost-effective adequacy level. 
 
                                                           
21 For instance, a system with 11 GW of installed capacity and 10 GW of peak demand has a 10% capacity margin. In two of the 
eleven Member States only this relatively simple capacity margin is calculated. 
22 VOLL calculation is quite complex. It is normally based on surveys and includes several factors such as types of customers, 
duration of interruption, frequency and occurrence time. 
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Table 2, based on replies to the sector inquiry, shows the MSs practices in setting a reliability standard. 
There are some MSs that do not measure this level, and others that have not even defined a reliability 
standard when introducing capacity mechanism.  
Table 2: MSs practice in setting a reliability standard, source: (EC, 2016h) 
 
1.4.3. Limiting the introduction of capacity mechanisms 
Considering the views of EC (2016g) sector inquiry report, the CEP E-Regulation includes a proposal to limit 
the implementation of capacity mechanisms. A European resource adequacy assessment is proposed as a 
binding measure, against reliability standards, to justify the use of a CM. Also, the Commission promotes, 
in the proposal, the use of market reforms, in case of generation adequacy concerns, before the 
implementation of capacity mechanisms.  
A European resource adequacy assessment 
According to the E-Regulation, the implementation of capacity mechanism should be justified by a 
European adequacy assessment. Article 18 of the E-Regulation states that MS shall monitor resource 
adequacy within their territory based on this assessment. If the European assessment has not identified a 
resource adequacy concern, MSs are not allowed to apply any capacity mechanisms.  
 
The European resource adequacy assessment shall cover the ‘overall adequacy of the electricity system to 
supply current and projected demands for electricity for a ten-year period from the date of that 
assessment, in a yearly resolution’, (article 19 of the E-Regulation). It should be developed every year by 
ENTSO-E. The necessary data for its development shall be provided by TSOs to ENTSO-E. The assessment 
should be based, according to article 19(4), on harmonised methodological standards ensuring, inter alia, 
that it is carried out on bidding zone level and is based on appropriate scenarios of projected demand and 
supply.  
 
An additional national assessment proposed by the Council  
The Council proposal for the E-Regulation added, in article 18 & 19a, a national resource adequacy 
assessment to be performed by MSs next to the European assessment. It states, in article 18(1) that 
‘Member States shall monitor resource adequacy within their territory based on the European resource 
adequacy assessment pursuant to Article 19 and may perform in addition national resource adequacy 
assessment pursuant to Article 19a.’ The national assessment shall use the ‘same modelling tools as used 
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by the ENTSO for Electricity for the European resource adequacy assessment and the same input data and 
other data to reflect national scenarios, sensitivities and assumptions.’ 
 
When there is a divergence23 between the national and the European resource adequacy assessment with 
regard to the same bidding zone, article 18 (3a) states that ‘the body governing the national resource 
adequacy assessment shall consult the ENTSO for Electricity and request for an opinion of the Agency.’ A 
report reasoning on the occurring divergence shall be submitted by the body governing the national 
resource adequacy assessment to ENTSO-E and ACER, within one month from the publication of the 
national assessment. The concerned Member State shall take due notice of the ENTSO-E assessment on 
these divergences and ACER opinion. 
Reliability standards 
The E-Regulation also proposes the development of EU-wide methodologies for calculating coherent 
reliability standards, representing the basis for capacity mechanism implementation decisions. Article 20 
of the E-Regulation states that ‘when applying capacity mechanisms Member States shall have a reliability 
standard in place indicating their desired level of security of supply in a transparent manner’. Reliability 
standards shall be set by the national regulatory authority based on the methodology pursuant to article 
19(5). This article states that ‘by [OP: six months after entry into force of this Regulation], the ENTSO for 
Electricity shall submit to the Agency a draft methodology for calculating: 
(a) the value of lost load; 
(b) the "cost of new entry" for generation, or demand response; and 
(c) the reliability standard expressed as "expected energy not served" and the "loss of load expectation".’ 
 
Article 20(3) adds that ‘reliability standard shall be calculated using the value of lost load and the cost of 
new entry over a given timeframe.’ Also, ‘the parameters determining the amount of capacity procured in 
the capacity mechanism shall be approved by the national regulatory authority’ (article 20(4)). 
 
Market reforms before implementing capacity mechanisms 
To address the regulatory distortions at the level of MS, article 18(3) of the E-Regulation states that MSs 
shall publish a timeline for adopting measures to eliminate these distortions. The same article adds that 
‘when addressing resource adequacy concerns Member States shall in particular consider removing 
regulatory distortions, enabling scarcity pricing, developing interconnection, energy storage, demand side 
measures and energy efficiency.’ 
 
According to EC (2016g) sector inquiry, when the adequacy assessment has identified resource adequacy 
concerns, Member States should assess the regulatory distortions causing these concerns before 
introducing capacity mechanisms. They are required to put in place measures to address these distortions, 
such as market reforms, as shown in Figure 8. The sector inquiry report highlighted four market reforms 
that can address the security of supply concern and may even remove the need for capacity mechanisms. 
Member States that have introduced capacity mechanisms should also make appropriate efforts to 
integrate market reforms as they are not substitutable by capacity mechanisms. The market reforms are: 
 
- Removing excessively low price caps to allow price spikes, reflecting consumers' willingness to pay and 
situations of scarcity. This will provide signals for new investment in the adequate capacity 
needed ensuring reliability and flexibility or for keeping existing capacity operational. 
                                                           
23 A divergence means that the national resource adequacy assessment identifies a concern with regards to a bidding zone and 
the European resource adequacy assessment has not identified a concern. 
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- Increasing demand response participation is another market reform for addressing the adequacy of 
supply. Efficient real-time responsiveness of demand to prices can flatten demand peaks and substitutes 
additional generation needs.  
- A de-lineation of bidding zones can form appropriate local prices incentivising local generation capacity 
investments as well as transmission network expansion. 
- A balancing market reform to increase competition as well as to standardise balancing products and 
procurement rules from neighbouring countries. 
 
Figure 8 explains the process the Commission has proposed to address adequacy concerns in  MSs. 
 
Figure 8: New framework for Capacity Mechanisms, based on (EC, 2017a) 
1.4.4. Limiting discrimination: existing versus new solutions in capacity mechanisms 
Demand response providers still face important barriers for participating in capacity mechanisms across 
Europe (EC, 2016g). The report of the sector inquiry on capacity mechanisms concluded that capacity 
mechanisms should be open to all types of potential capacity providers, except for the mechanisms 
specific for demand response24, and strategic reserves25. 
 
The Commission proposal for the E-Directive and E-Regulation does not contain precise rules for 
participating in capacity mechanisms, while the Council position, brings more clarification, inter alia, for 
the participation of storage, energy efficiency and demand response. Article 23(3c) states that ‘capacity 
mechanisms shall:  
(a) not create unnecessary market distortions and not limit cross zonal trade;  
(b) be market-based; 
                                                           
24 Given their particular ability to address market failures. 
25According to EC, (2016g) ‘market distortions can be kept at a minimum if the reserve is kept as small as possible’.  Strategic 
reserve is designed not to promote new generation capacity. 
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(C) be open to participation of all resources that are capable of providing the required technical 
performance in a technology neutral manner and through fair and transparent rules, including but not 
limited to participation of storage, energy efficiency and demand response; 
(d) be temporary, but are permitted, in accordance with state aid rules, as long as the relevant resource 
adequacy assessment identifies a resource adequacy concern;  
(e) not go beyond what is necessary to address the resource adequacy concern.’ 
1.4.5.  Limiting the impacts on climate goals 
According to article 23(4), the Commission proposes that a generation capacity emitting more than 550gr 
CO2/kWh, and for which the final investment decision has been made be made after the entry into force 
of the Regulation, shall not be eligible to participate in a CM. It adds, for existing capacities emitting 550 
gr CO2/kWh or more, that they ‘shall not be committed in capacity mechanisms 5 years after the entry 
into force of this Regulation.’ Such proposal will limit the most climate-damaging capacity payments. 
 
The Council position provides an extra emission threshold, expressed in kg CO2 on average per year per 
installed kW, and indicates a fixed deadline for the payments. This means that the plants have to commit 
to one of the requirements. Article 23(4) states that new plants will only be eligible to receive payments 
in a capacity market from 31 December 2025 if 
• Their emissions are below 550 gr CO2/KWh, or 
• Their emissions are less than 700 kg CO2 on average per year per installed KW. 
 
For existing plants, and with the same threshold of emission, the Council proposes the deadline to ‘be 31 
December 2030, except for contracts with a remaining duration of not more than 5 years concluded before 
31 December 2030. Between 31 December 2025 and 31 December 2030, the capacity receiving 
remuneration for this participation should be reduced by 5% per year.’ 
 
This emission limitation will impact the participation of coal-fired power plants, as well as gas peaking 
plants, in CMs as they emit, in most cases, more than the stated threshold of 550 gr CO2/KWh (IEA, 2013). 
The Council’s additional limit, based on yearly emissions, may enable highly emitting plants to continue to 
receive payments from a CM as long as they are dispatched occasionally (a few hours per year).  
1.4.6. Limiting cross-border concerns 
Regarding the cross border effects of capacity mechanisms, the findings of the EC, (2016g) report highlight 
the necessity of taking into account cross-border participation in CMs to ensure efficient signals and avoid 
internal market failure such as distorting cross-border trade, leading to suboptimal investments and 
creating shifts of generation capacity towards the country with a capacity mechanism. 
 
Article 21 of the Commission E-Regulation states in point 1 that ‘mechanisms other than strategic 
reserves26 shall be open to direct participation of capacity providers located in another Member State (…).’ 
Indeed, CMs must be open to explicit cross-border participation to limit distortions to cross-border trade 
and competition as well as providing incentives for interconnection investment to ensure the EU security 
of electricity supply at least costs. Point 12 adds that ‘national regulatory authorities shall ensure that 
cross-border participation in capacity mechanisms is organised in an effective and non-discriminatory 
manner. (…).’ 
                                                           
26 The Council position adds that where technically feasible, strategic reserves, shall be open to direct cross-border participation. 
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Regional Operational Centres (ROCs)27, national TSOs, the ENTSO for electricity and NRAs via ACER will be 
involved in the development of technical parameters for the participation of foreign capacities as well as 
the operational rules for their participation. For instance, according to article 21(6) of the E-Regulation, 
the maximum entry capacity available for the participation of foreign capacity shall be annually calculated 
by ROCs, established under article 32 of the Regulation. The calculation, required for each bidding zone 
border, should take into account ‘the expected availability of interconnection and the likely concurrence 
of system stress between the system where the mechanism is applied and the system in which the foreign 
capacity is located.’ 
 
The Council position assigns the calculation of the capacity available for the participation of foreign 
capacity to TSOs. Article 21(6) states  that ‘Transmission System Operators shall annually calculate the 
maximum entry capacity available for the participation of foreign capacity based on the methodology 
referred in point (a) of paragraph 10 and taking into account the recommended values calculated by the 
Regional Security Coordinators28 pursuant to Article 34(q), 38 and 39, the level of physical interconnection 
between Member States, expected availability of interconnection and the likely concurrence of system 
stress between the system where the mechanism is applied and the system in which the foreign capacity 
is located. A calculation is required for each bidding zone border.’ 
 
Finally, on ‘design principles for capacity mechanisms’, article 23 (2), aiming to reduce cross-border 
effects, states that when a MS plans to introduce a CM, it shall consult with the connected neighbouring 
states. It adds in point (3) that ‘capacity mechanisms shall not create unnecessary market distortions and 
not limit cross-border trade. (…).’  
 
 
                                                           
27 The creation of new Regional Operational Centres (ROCs), that will build on the framework established by the Regional Security 
Coordinators in the CEP, aims to ensure a more co-ordinated regional approach to transmission system operations. For more 
information, please see 1.5.2. 
28 The Council position removed the introduction of ROCs and kept the Regional Security Coordinators, also discussed in 1.5.2. 
Commission proposal  
-Proposal for a European resource adequacy assessment.  
-Proposal for common methodologies for reliability standards. 
-Limitation of the most damaging capacity payments, by introducing emission threshold. 
-Existing Generation plants not respecting emission requirements cannot participate in CMs 5 years 
after entry into force of the Regulation. 
- CMs (except SR) shall be open to direct cross-border participation of capacity providers.  
-The maximum entry capacity available for the participation of foreign capacity shall be annually 
calculated by Regional Operational Centres.  
Council Position 
-A national resource adequacy assessment, may be performed by MS in addition to the European 
assessment. 
-An extra emission threshold expressed in Kg CO2 on average per year per installed KW  
-The deadline for future payments of under a capacity mechanism is 31 December 2025. 
-TSOs shall annually calculate this maximum entry capacity available for cross-border participation. 
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1.4.7. Stakeholders’ positions 
The EURELECTRIC (2017a) position on the E-Regulation disagrees with the binding aspects of the European 
resource adequacy assessment. It states that ‘a move towards a European/regional approach to security 
of supply is welcome as it will allow developing a common forecast of reliable and firm capacity provided 
by all assets (generation, demand response and storage) as well as potential cross-border contribution. 
The European mid-term adequacy assessment performed by ENTSO-E shall be factored in but shall however 
not be considered as a binding factor for MS to introduce security of supply measures (e.g. capacity 
mechanisms). On the contrary, several adequacy assessments with different geographical scope 
(European, regional, national) and granularity in the underlying assumptions should be taken into account 
by MS.’ 
 
Regarding the provisions on reliability standards, EURELECTRIC added that ‘all MS should define and 
publicly disclose their desired level of SoS target based on harmonised metrics – and not only the MS that 
apply for CM. While the choice of adequacy metrics should be harmonised, each country should be free to 
set its desired level of adequacy. We would also welcome more clarity on how the provisions of the 
electricity regulation on adequacy assessment and reliability standards on one side, and the provisions of 
the Risk Preparedness Regulation on the other side are interlinked.’ 
 
EURELECTRIC also disagrees with the proposed emission limitation in capacity mechanisms and states that 
‘the most cost-efficient way to deliver this transition29 and the needed investments is through a market-
based approach. Command and control tools, such as an emission performance standard, should be 
avoided.’ EURELECTRIC partially agrees with the provisions on cross-border participation in capacity 
mechanisms and states that ‘cross-border participation should apply to all types of mechanisms aimed at 
ensuring security of supply, including strategic reserves.’ 
 
CEER ‘broadly welcomes the system adequacy and CRM-related proposals in the Clean Energy package.’ It 
stresses the benefits of an EU-wide methodology, implemented at regional level, with a strong 
coordinating role for ENTSO-E in order to ensure consistency. Also, CEER believes that ‘at least in the short 
term, this assessment may be complemented by national adequacy studies’ (CEER, 2017d). On the 
compliance of existing mechanisms with the future regulatory framework, CEER states that the 
Commission proposal ‘does not provide a clear framework to ensure compliance of existing mechanisms 
with the future regulatory framework’. It adds that the process needs to consider the ‘State Aid inquiry 
framework’ and decisions taken within that. 
 
According to ENTSO-E a ‘European Resource Adequacy is welcome, but it needs to respect subsidiarity’. 
ENTSO-E supports the Commission proposal for harmonising resource adequacy methodologies across 
Europe (ENTSO-E, 2017b). It adds that ‘whilst resource adequacy assessments need one common 
methodological basis, ENTSO-E recommends not to replace national assessments by the MAF, because 
national assessments will continue having better granularity. The European and regional assessments 
should complement national analyses and challenge them. Any national disagreement or divergence has 
to be justified.’ On cross-border participation, ENTSO-E adds that ‘the decision on the amount of cross-
border capacity for the participation of foreign capacity should be left to TSOs rather than assigned to 
Regional Operation Centres.’ 
 
                                                           
29 Refers to low-carbon transition to achieve a carbon-neutral electricity supply by 2050. 
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Several other EU organisations among them SEDC30, Solar Power Europe, and Wind Europe agree, in SEDC 
et al., (2017), with the CEP proposals for implementing capacity mechanisms only as a last resort, when 
proven strictly necessary by a European adequacy assessment. They also support the proposal for ensuring 
all resources participation in capacity mechanisms and the regular review of these mechanisms.  
 
BEUC, (2017a) policy paper on ‘Energy Markets Of The Future’ states that ‘security of supply should be 
ensured at the lowest costs for consumers and reasons to introduce capacity mechanisms should be 
properly scrutinised. Costs of capacity mechanisms and their impact on consumers’ bills should be carefully 
assessed. If they are deemed necessary, capacity mechanisms should be non-discriminatory and should 
include not only generation capacities but all kinds of flexibility mechanisms such as interconnection 
capacities, demand-side response, storage and energy efficiency. Capacity mechanisms should only be a 
temporary measure of last resort, limited in time and accompanied by a clear exit strategy.’ It adds in the 
letter addressed to the Permanent Representation of the EU (BEUC, 2017b), ‘in view of the Council 
discussions on the revision of the Electricity Directive and the Electricity Regulation and the latest texts 
prepared by the Estonian Presidency’ that ‘at the same time, the need for capacity mechanisms should be 
coordinated at the EU level and based on an accurate regional resource adequacy assessment. Therefore, 
current discussion on the national resource adequacy assessments and its role risks undermining the 
importance of the European adequacy assessment.’ 
 
Wind Europe supports, in its response to EC proposals (Wind Europe, 2017), ‘an Emission Performance 
Standard (EPS) of 550 gr CO2/kWh in the frame of a CRM.’ It states that ‘whilst a robust Emission Trading 
System (ETS) might encourage a switch of fuel use, an EPS would provide an ultimate backstop limit to 
investments in polluting technologies that are built now on the promise of emission reduction technologies 
which may never be commercially viable.’ 
 
The position paper on the CEP, REScoop, (2017b) states that ‘the introduction of capacity mechanisms by 
Member States should be tightly regulated and overseen at EU level to ensure they do not raise costs for 
consumers, discriminate against renewables, discourage flexible consumption, or disincentivise energy 
efficiency.’ It adds in REScoop, (2017c) that the ‘newly proposed EU rules on capacity mechanisms could 
allow fossil fuel generators to hoodwink consumers out of their money for at least another decade. With a 
market that is already saturated with energy production, this will lock in dirty energy and continue to 
distort markets, preventing signals being sent to businesses and consumers that they should pursue energy 
savings and become active.’ 
 
The CO2 cap proposal was also backed by 22 signatories from energy majors, renewable energy groups 
and utilities including Eni, Shell, Siemens, Iberdrola and Statoil (ENI et al., 2017). They stated that 
‘electricity bills should not support the operation of the most polluting power plants, given that cleaner 
supply options are available. This would clearly contradict EU climate and energy policy objectives and 
would go against the best interest of European consumers.’ 
1.5. Interlinkage with Network codes  
In what follows, we first discuss the interlinkages between topics that are covered in the first generation 
of network codes, which are addressed in the CEP proposals, i.e. balancing responsibilities, the regional 
governance of system operation, bidding zones, and the calculation of interconnection capacities. Then, 
                                                           
30 Smart Energy Demand Coalition, the European business association focusing on digital, decentralised energy solutions. It 
changed its name to smarten in December 2017. 
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we also introduce the scope of the second generation of network codes that has been foreseen in the CEP 
proposals.   
The first generation of network codes includes:  
• The market codes: 
o Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July 2015 establishing a guideline on 
capacity allocation and congestion management (CACM) 
o Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/1719 26 September 2016 establishing a guideline on 
forward capacity allocation (FCA) 
o Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/2195 of 23 November 2017 establishing a guideline on 
electricity balancing (EBGL)  
• The connection codes: 
o Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/631 of 14 April 2016 establishing a network code on 
requirements for grid connection of generators (RfG NC)  
o Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/1388 of 17 August 2016 establishing a network code 
on demand connection (DCC)  
o Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/1447 of 26 August 2016 establishing a network code 
on requirements for grid connection of high voltage direct current systems and direct 
current-connected power park modules (HVDC NC)  
• The operation codes: 
o Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/1485 of 2 August 2017 establishing a guideline on 
electricity transmission system operation (SOGL)  
o Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/2196 of 24 November 2017 establishing a network 
code on electricity emergency and restoration (ER)  
For a more complete introduction to the first generation of network codes, see Meeus and Schittekatte 
(2018). 
1.5.1. Balancing responsibilities  
Balancing in network codes 
The Balancing Guideline (EBGL) has been adopted as Electricity Regulation and entered into force in 
18/12/2017.  Balancing responsibilities are not explicitly mentioned in the electricity network codes. 
However, the EBGL article 18(1) states that no later than six months after its entry into force and for all 
scheduling areas of a MS, a proposal regarding the terms and conditions for BSPs and BRPs should be 
submitted by the TSOs of this MS. This proposal shall contain the definition of balance responsibility for 
each connection (in a way that avoids any gaps or overlaps in the balance responsibility of different market 
participants providing services to that connection). It is also important to add that article 18(4d) of the 
EBGL states that it is required that each balancing energy bid from a BSP is assigned to one or more BRPs 
to enable the calculation of an imbalance adjustment. 
CEP proposals on balancing responsibilities 
Article 2(2) of the E-Regulation defines a BRP as ‘a market participant or its chosen representative 
responsible for its imbalances in the electricity market’. The balance responsibility is passed on to the) BRP 
before the actual delivery. A BRP can represent one or more electricity generators, suppliers and/or large 
consumers. 
 
On Balancing responsibility, article 4 of the CEP E-Regulation indicates in the first paragraph that ‘all 
market participants shall aim for system balance and shall be financially responsible for imbalances they 
cause in the system. They shall either be balance responsible parties or delegate their responsibility to a 
balance responsible party of their choice.’ 
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Derogations from balance responsibilities 
The derogation from balance responsibility is possible for projects with the following characteristics, 
article 4(2) of the regulation: 
‘(a) demonstration projects31; 
(b) generating installations using renewable energy sources or high-efficiency cogeneration with an 
installed electricity capacity of less than 500 kW32; 
(c) installations benefitting from support approved by the Commission under Union State aid rules pursuant 
to Articles 107 to 109 TFEU33, and commissioned prior to [OP: entry into force]. Member States may, subject 
to Union state aid rules, incentivise market participants which are fully or partly exempted from balancing 
responsibility to accept full balancing responsibility against appropriate compensation.’ 
 
From 1 January 2026, point (b) of paragraph 2 shall apply only ‘to generating installations using renewable 
energy sources or high-efficiency cogeneration with an installed electricity capacity of less than 250 kW34’ 
(article 4(3)). 
 
The Council, in its position, adds that when a MS chooses to provide a derogation according to article 4 
(2), it needs to ensure that the financial responsibilities of imbalances are fulfilled by another party. It also 
reduces the capacity threshold from 500 kW to 250 KW in the point (2b) regarding the derogation capacity 
of the generating installations and from 250 kW to 150 kW for the point (3), for the capacity limit beyond 
2026, as explained in the footnotes. 
1.5.2. System operation regional governance 
RSCs in network codes 
The system operation guideline (SOGL) introduced the establishment of Regional Security Coordinators 
(RSCs). RSCs are owned or controlled by TSOs and perform tasks related to TSO regional coordination. The 
SOGL states that each control area shall be covered by at least one RSC. A control area is defined as a 
coherent part of the interconnected system, operated by a single system operator. RSCs combine the tasks 
outlined in the SOGL and the capacity calculation stated in the CACM. Regional cooperation in SO allows 
TSOs to have a regional vision on threats to SO coming from regional power flows. The TSOs remain in 
charge of security of supply and consequently of the final operational decision-making. RSCs are intended 
to provide five core services which are presented in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9: Services provided by RSCs to TSOs, source: (ENTSO-E, 2016) 
                                                           
31 A ‘demonstration project’ means a project demonstrating a technology as a first of its kind in the Union and representing a 
significant innovation that goes well beyond the state of the art (article2 (2x) of the E-Regulation). 
32 Set to 250 kW in the council proposal. 
33 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
34 Set to 150 kW in the council proposal. 
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CEP proposal for the implementation of ROCs 
The proposal for the E-Regulation has introduced the implementation of ROCs. ENTSO-E should develop, 
in consultation with ACER for the guidelines, the execution framework of ROCs tasks and ensure overall 
alignment between ROCs and national TSOs. The ROCs implementation aims for a centralisation of SO in 
larger geographic areas prior to real-time while keeping a national TSO focus for the real-time operations 
(EC, 2015b). CEP proposals on ROCs functions complements the RSCIs35 voluntary TSOs approach and the 
RSCs Network Codes ones as shown in Figure 10. The proposal excludes the real-time operation of the 
system which is left for national TSOs. The full list of ROCs functions is available in article 34 and in ANNEX 
I of the E-Regulation. 
 
 
Figure 10 Sequence of ROCs functions, source: (EC, 2017b) 
The removal of ROCs in the Council proposal 
The Council position for the E-Regulation removes the naming of the ROCs and proposes to keep the RSCs. 
Article 32 of the E-Regulation changes the requirement to establish ROCs within 12 months as stated in 
the Commission proposal, to the submission of a proposal by TSOs to NRAs for the enhancement of RSCs. 
They shall take up their new tasks by 1 January 2025. The tasks of the RSCs can be found in article 34 of 
the Council position for the E-Regulation. For instance, compared to the Commission proposal, the point 
(d) of article 34(1) was changed from ‘consistency assessment of transmission system operators' defence 
plans and restoration plans’ to ‘support the consistency assessment of transmission system operators' 
defence plans and restoration plans.’ Also, the system adequacy forecasts were limited from week ahead 
to day ahead instead of intraday. The ‘coordination and optimisation of regional restoration’ in point (e) 
was changed into ‘support the coordination and optimisation of regional restoration as requested by 
transmission system operators.’ 
 
Moreover, the Council proposed to give the right to introduce additional RSCs functions to NRAs instead 
of the Commission.  
                                                           
35 The Regional Security Coordination Initiatives (RSCIs) were launched voluntarily by TSOs since 2009. They aim to improve TSOs 
cooperation by covering a greater part of the European interconnected networks. CORESO and TSC are the pioneers in this respect 




1.5.3. Bidding zones and capacity calculation between zones 
Bidding zones in Europe  
 Europe is divided into different bidding zones as shown in Figure 11. Their delimitations are defined 
mainly by national borders (France or Spain). Other bidding zones can be smaller within the same countries 
(Italy or Sweden) or grouping more than one country (Austria, Germany36, and Luxembourg).  
 
Within a bidding zone, electricity wholesale prices are the same. Market participants who wish to trade 
electricity in another bidding zone have to consider bidding zone interconnection constraints. As long as 
electricity can flow freely through the interconnector (no congestion), there will be a single price across 
the markets. The markets are then called fully coupled. However, when the cross-zonal interconnector is 
congested between bidding zones, prices can diverge between those zones. The markets of the two 
bidding zones are in this case split. The price differential between the two interconnected bidding zones 
in case of congestion is called the congestion rent, and this is a revenue for the TSOs owning the 
interconnection.37  
 
Figure 11: Bidding zones in Europe, source: (Ofgem, 2014) 
A review process to be undertaken by TSOs has been formalised in legislation as part of the CACM 
Guideline on the existing and possible alternative configurations. In November 2017, ENTSO-E developed 
the first edition of the bidding zone review (ENTSO-E, 2017c). The review was based on three categories 
of criteria: network security, market efficiency and stability and robustness of bidding zones, as prescribed 
in CACM regulation. However, the evaluation presented in this report did not provide sufficient evidence 
                                                           
36 In October 2018, the Germany and Austria common bidding zone will be separated into two bidding zones, according to the 
joint statement published by the German and Austrian authorities. Italy is also undergoing a bidding zone review. A decision by 
Italian Regulator is due by the end of June 2018 (ARERA, 2018). 
37 For example, imagine, that during a certain hour the interconnectors between two bidding zones are congested. The price in 
one bidding zone equals 30 €/MWh and 40 €/MWh in the other. The interconnection capacity between the two bidding zones is 
500 MW. This means that the congestion rent for this hour is 5,000 €.  
27 
 
for maintaining or for a modification of the current bidding zone configuration. The participating TSOs 
recommended to maintain the current bidding zone delimitation. This was actually quite a lengthy 
process. Early studies began in 2012, where ACER invited ENTSO-E to initiate a pilot project on bidding 
zone configuration assessment and review. ENTSO-E published a technical report in January 2014, 
followed by the ACER Market Report in March 2014. Based on those early findings, in the spring of 2015 
ENTSO-E began its investigation on the technical and economic efficiency of the current European bidding 
zones, including the possibility of splitting the German-Austrian bidding zone (Rossetto, 2017). 
CEP proposals on bidding zones 
The European Commission and Council have different positions in their respective proposals for the E-
Regulation. Indeed, the Commission proposed in article 13 that more powers would be given to EU 
institutions to decide on price zone configuration following the bidding zone review. ACER shall approve 
and may request amendments to the methodology and assumptions of the review methodology instead 
of NRAs. Moreover, according to article 13(4) of the E-Regulation, TSOs ‘participating in the bidding zone 
review shall submit a proposal to the Commission regarding whether to amend or maintain the bidding 
zone configuration.’ Article 13(4) adds that ‘based on that proposal, the Commission shall adopt a decision 
whether to amend or maintain the bidding zone configuration, [no later than 6 months after entry into 
force of this Regulation, specific date to be inserted by OP] or by six months after the conclusion of the 
bidding zone configuration.’ 
 
The Council proposal for the E-Regulation foresees a more national decision-making power for bidding 
zones. ACER is tasked to decide on the methodology of the review if the relevant NRAs do not come to a 
unanimous decision within three months, (article 13(3) of the Council position). The bidding zone review 
shall be submitted in a joint proposal by the participating TSOs to the relevant Member States or 
designated NRAs. Then, according to article 13(4a), ‘where structural congestion has been identified, by 
one or more transmission system operator, or where the bidding zone review recommends a bidding zone 
change of one or more Member States, the concerned Member States in cooperation with their 
transmission system operators have the possibility, within 6 months, to define action plans, national or 
multinational.’ This action plan contains measures38 to reduce the structural congestions identified ‘within 
the period of [no later than [4] years after entry into force of this Regulation, specific date to be inserted 
by OJ39].’ 
 
At the end of the action plan implementation, MS should decide whether to opt for a split of bidding zones 
or for remedial actions (for which they will bear the costs) to solve remaining congestions, according to  
article 13(4c). If MSs fail to find a consensus, the EC shall be informed and it may make further proposals 
for a balanced solution and as a measure of last resort, the ‘Commission shall adopt a decision whether to 
amend or maintain the bidding zone configuration in and between those Member States that are subject 
to the decision’,(article 13 (4e)). 
CEP proposal for interconnector capacity calculation 
The rules on capacity allocation as stated in the Commission's proposal for E-Regulation require the 
allocation of maximum capacity to market participants on the bidding zone border. According to article 
14(3), ‘the maximum capacity of the interconnections and/or the transmission networks affecting cross-
border flows shall be made available to market participants, complying with safety standards of secure 
                                                           
38 For example: the acceleration of network development, more efficient use of existing infrastructure, a review of current 
system operation practices, increased coordination of system operation with relevant neighboring transmission system 
operators. 
39 Official Journal of the European Union.  
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network operation.’ It adds that ‘countertrading and redispatch, including cross-border redispatch, shall 
be used to maximise available capacities, unless it is demonstrated that it is not beneficial to economic 
efficiency at Union level.’ 
 
TSOs, according to article 14(7), shall not limit the volume of interconnection capacity to be made 
available to market participants in order to solve congestion inside their control area or as a means of 
managing flows on a border between two control areas observed even without any transaction40. Article 
14(10) adds that ‘financial penalties for failure to honour obligations associated with the allocation of 
capacity shall be attributed to those who are responsible for such a failure, according to the same article.’ 
 
In the Council text, a benchmark level of the maximum capacity established on the border is established 
and must be respected, as stated in recital (12) and (14a). MSs that fall below the benchmark level will 
need to start undertaking remedial actions or reconfiguring the bidding zones.  
 
The minimum level of capacity that should be used in capacity calculation has been set depending on the 
capacity calculation method as stated in article 14(7) of the Council position; 
 
(i) ‘For borders using a coordinated net transmission capacity approach, 75% of the net transfer capacity 
pursuant to capacity allocation and congestion management guideline adopted on the basis of Article 18 
of the Regulation 714/2009;  
(ii) For borders using a flow-based approach41, 75% of the remaining available margin on internal and 
cross border critical network elements made available for cross border flows pursuant to capacity 
allocation and congestion management guideline adopted on the basis of Article 18 of the Regulation 
714/2009.’  
Derogations can be given to TSOs for a limited period, according to article 14 (7a) & (7b). 
 
Note that the Council-proposed threshold differentiates between the capacity calculation methods; net 
transfer capacity (NTC) and flow-based capacity calculation (FBCC) and does not involve a direct link to 
thermal capacity. To find out more about the relationship between the thermal capacity, NTC and FBCC, 
please see (ACER and CEER, 2017a) 
1.5.4. Scope of the second generation of NC 
Electricity Regulation 714/2009 identified twelve focus areas for network codes. From these twelve areas, 
only half are covered by the first generation of network codes that has been developed since the 
introduction of the third package. For the following six areas, network codes have not yet been developed. 
 
-third-party access rules;  
-data exchange and settlement rule; 
-interoperability rules; 
-transparency rules; 
-rules regarding harmonised transmission tariff structures incl. locational signals and inter-transmission 
system operator compensation rules;  
-energy efficiency regarding electricity networks; 
                                                           
40  That is, it flows over control areas caused by having the origin and destination within one control area. 
41 The CACM stipulates in recital (7) that the flow-based method should be used as a primary approach for day-ahead and intraday 
capacity calculation where cross-zonal capacity between bidding zones is highly interdependent and may only be introduced after 
market participants have been consulted and given sufficient preparation time to allow for a smooth transition. 
29 
 
The Commission proposal for E-Regulation has added four additional focus areas to be covered by NC in 
article 55. They concern: 
-rules for non-discriminatory, transparent provision of non-frequency ancillary services, including steady 
state voltage control, inertia, fast reactive current injection, black-start capability; 
-demand response, including aggregation42, energy storage, and demand curtailment rules; 
-cyber security rules; and 
-rules concerning regional operational centres. 
 
Moreover, the E-Regulation proposal adds the harmonisation of distribution tariffs next to the 
transmission ones, as discussed in 1.3.2. 
 
The Council position has brought some changes in the proposed focus areas. The addition of the 
harmonisation of distribution tariffs has been removed in the Council position. Moreover, two new 
proposed areas were removed: ‘demand response, including aggregation, energy storage, and demand 
curtailment rules’ and ‘rules concerning regional operational centres’. 
 
  
                                                           
42 An aggregator, according to article 2(14) of the E-Directive is ‘a market participant that combines multiple customer loads or 
generated electricity for sale, for purchase or auction in any organised energy market.’ 
Commission proposal 
-All market participants shall aim for system balance and shall be financially responsible for imbalances 
they cause in the system. Derogations are possible for projects with certain characteristics. 
-ROCs are established for a centralisation of the System Operations through regional cooperation. They 
gradually build on RSCs. 
-ROCs complement TSOs roles to ensure secure and reliable operation of the interconnected 
transmission system. 
- More powers to be given to EU institutions (Commission and ACER) to decide on price zone 
configuration following the review. 
- Addition of four focus areas to be covered by NC. 
Council position 
- A lower threshold for derogations from balancing responsibilities. 
- Removing the proposal for the introduction of ROCs and keeping the RSCs. 
- A more national decision power for bidding zones. 
-The addition of the harmonisation of distribution tariffs, in the NC focus areas, has been removed as 
well as two new proposed areas. 
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2. Adapting to the decentralisation of the power system 
 
In this section, we set the scene by introducing the DSO landscape in Europe. We then focus on key 
measures included in the CEP proposals to adapt the DSOs’ roles and responsibilities to the ongoing 
decentralisation of the power system. This includes increased expectations in their traditional roles of 
network planning and network management. It also covers the limitations that have been introduced for 
DSO ownership of EV charging infrastructures, storage facilities, and for data management by DSOs. To 
conclude, we will discuss the establishment of an EU DSO entity, and the interlinkages between DSO topics 
and network codes.  
2.1. Setting the scene: The DSO landscape  
 
There are around 2,600 DSOs (Figure 12) that own and operate around 10 million km of power lines in 
Europe. They employ around 240,000 people and service 260 million customers. About 90 % of these 
customers are residential and small businesses (Meeus and Glachant, 2018).  
 
 
Figure 12: Number of electricity DSOs per Member State, source: (EC, 2016e) 
Despite the large number of DSOs in Europe, the distribution industry sector is rather concentrated. In 
countries such as Ireland, Slovenia and Lithuania, there is only one DSO. In France (148 DSOs) and Italy 
(151 DSOs), there is one dominant DSO and many small players sharing small market shares. In other MSs 
we find a significantly lower concentration. For instance, in Austria (128 DSOs), Belgium (26 DSOs), Sweden 
(170 DSOs), and Germany (883 DSOs), the three largest DSOs represent less than half of the industry 
(Meeus and Glachant, 2018). Today, according to data from EC, (2016e), only 13% of the European DSOs 
have more than 100,000 connected customers. 
 
DSOs are represented in five different industry associations based in Brussels: EURELECTRIC, GEODE, 
CEDEC, EDSO for Smart Grids and REScoop. The larger DSOs in Europe work together within the association 
31 
 
EDSO for smart grids. This association has about 30 members that represent more than 70 per cent of the 
industry. EURELECTRIC gathers electricity industry companies (generators and retailers, most of them are 
not ownership-unbundled). CEDEC and GEODE represent smaller ‘local’ and ‘regional’ energy distributors. 
REScoop is the federation of energy cooperatives which undertake distribution activities in some cases.  
 
2.2. Current practices  
According to CEER, (2015), the DSOs activities can be separated into three categories. This categorisation 
regards the nature and the different businesses at the distribution network: 
  
• Core activities, such as planning, developing, operating and maintaining the network, connecting 
users to the grid, managing technical data and managing network losses; 
• Prohibited activities such as electricity generation; 
• Non-core activities or grey areas where there are concerns about DSOs activities, such as 
infrastructure for EVs, flexibility services such as the ownership of flexibility assets, managing 
metering data for customers. 
 
Their logical framework for categorising DSOs activities is described in Figure 13. 
 
Different organisations representing DSOs at EU level 
•  EDSO for Smart Grids, founded in 2010, gathers leading European distribution system operators for 
electricity, like Innogy in Germany, Enedis in France and Vattenfall in Sweden, cooperating for the 
development of smart grids with a focus on EU RD&D, policy, and Member State regulation. 
•  EURELECTRIC, the Union of the Electricity Industry founded in 1989, gathers the large power 
generators and retailers of the electricity sector. It represents the common interests of the electricity 
industry at the pan-European level and also their affiliates on other continents. It currently has over 34 
full members, representing the electricity industry in 32 European countries. EURELECTRIC works on 
behalf of European DSOs and their customers for a secure and reliable supply of electricity. 
•  CEDEC, from the french name Confédération Européenne des Distributeurs d'Énergie publics 
Communaux, is the European Federation of Local Energy Companies founded in 1992. It represents 
the interests of more than 1,500 local and regional energy companies – mostly in public hands – serving 
electricity and natural gas customers & connections in ten European countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
•  GEODE, founded in 1991, is made up of independent European gas and electricity distribution 
companies. The association represents more than 1,200 companies in 15 countries, both private & 
public owned. 
•  REScoop, short for renewable energy cooperative, is the European federation for renewable energy 
cooperatives. It is a network of 1,500 European cooperatives and their 1,000,000 members who co-





Figure 13: Logical Framework for DSO Activities, source: (CEER, 2014) 
For the grey areas, there is no single model defining how they should be regulated. The DSO involvement 
in areas such as the ownership of storage and EV charging infrastructure is allowed in some Member States 
under certain conditions. In such cases the aim is to help the development of this sector on a provisional 
mandate until the market develops to actual competition. 
2.2.1. Traditional Roles  
From a regulatory point of view, network planning and network maintenance are core DSO-activities, 
while the active network management (i.e., procurement of flexibility services) can be considered as a 
regulatory grey area. 
Network planning 
The EC, (2015c) study on tariff design for distribution systems presents the main features of the DSOs 
network development process. It considers whether the distribution network development plan is 
published in different MSs and whether the investments are subject to approval by the NRAs or the 
government. 
 
Across Europe, only DSOs in Italy, Portugal, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, UK, and Germany (for 
network assets at HV distribution level) publish distribution network development plans. In six MSs (Spain, 
Greece, Poland Portugal, Romania and Slovenia) distribution network development plans are approved by 
regulators. In France, Germany and Lithuania the regulator approves only selected investments (EC, 






Figure 14: Published distribution network development plans (DNDP), based on (EC, 2015c) 
The Commission report adds that the decision‐making process of distribution network development 
appears less structured and transparent than for transmission network development in most MSs. 
However, the importance of the process has increased with the recent trends in the sector. Distribution 
and transmission system operators may need to take a coordinated approach to network planning and 
development with transparent data exchange processes for an increased overall efficiency and quality of 
the electricity network. For instance, planned reinforcements on the transmission network may offset the 
need for reinforcements on the distribution system.  
Network management 
Today, some DSOs have already started to consider procuring flexibility services to re-dispatch the system 
at the level of distribution grids. However, in most countries, there are no rules in place that allow DSOs 
to do that. Figure 15 shows the different regulatory approach to flexibility services procurement in some 
MSs. 
 
Figure 15: DSOs incentives to procure flexibility services in Europe, source: (EC, 2016e) 
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According to the EvolvDSO43 project survey, in countries like France, Ireland, Italy or Portugal, DSOs are 
not able to contract flexibility for congestion management. Discussions on the topic are ongoing in these 
countries. In others, like Belgium and Germany44, DSOs can obtain system flexibility services via connection 
and distribution access contracts. These contracts provide a reduced network fee in exchange for the unit 
control by the DSO.  
2.2.2. Emerging Roles 
Storage facilities 
Electricity storage is one way of providing flexibility to the system. It can be defined as any device that can 
store electrical energy and make it available when required. Several types of storage technologies have 
been proposed, tested and are currently being implemented. Storage systems can be chemical, 
electrochemical, electrical, mechanical and thermal. Currently, pumped hydro, which is classified as 
mechanical storage, accounts for most of the storage capacity. This can be considered as a traditional 
storage technology as it has been around for a long time.  
 
However, due to rapid innovation, large-scale batteries (also referred to as electrochemical storage 
devices) are recently becoming economically viable (Obi et al., 2017). Batteries have some unique 
characteristics that set them apart from the traditional storage resources. These devices are modular and 
can be installed quickly, and they are not constrained by location. Not only can batteries be installed at 
any location, but they can also be moved to other locations as and when required cost-effectively. This 
makes them an invaluable resource for providing location-specific services such as voltage control for 
distribution grids. 
 
There is currently no common EU regulatory framework incorporating storage in distribution grids. In the 
UK, DSOs that have invested in batteries, are exempted from generation licence for capacities below 50 
MW and possibly up to 100 MW in individual cases. In Spain, the DSO and the TSO can own batteries and 
are also exempted from requiring authorisation if the generation output is less than 50MW45. Several 
other regulators across the EU have approved battery pilots in motivated cases, such as in Germany, Italy 
and Finland (Meeus and Bhagwat, 2018).  
EV charging infrastructure  
According to Meeus and Hadush (2018), 70,000 public charging points were in place in Europe by the end 
of 2016, representing one public charging point for every nine EVs. 27% of them are installed in the 
Netherlands. 90% of the public charging points in the EU are normal charging points (AC, <22 kW), meaning 
that full charging times is a matter of hours. The remaining 10% are considered fast (AC, >22 kW or DC, 
>25 kW) where the charging time is lower than an hour46. Also, there were 390,000 private charging points 
in Europe in 2016, bringing the total charging points to 460,000. During the year (2015-2016), the amount 
of public charging stations installed had a higher increase than the number of sold EVs (71% versus 53%). 
 
                                                           
43  EvolvDSO (‘Development of methodologies and tools for new and evolving DSO roles for efficient DRES integration in 
distribution networks’) is an FP7 collaborative project funded by the European Commission  
44 This is particularly relevant for DSOs in Germany where the distribution grid can be up to 110 kV and therefore hosts large 
amounts of DG. 
45 Ley 24/2013, de 26 de diciembre, del Sector Eléctrico. 
46 As a reference, it would take approximately 30 minutes for an 80 % charge or 120 km of extra range with a 60 kW DC charger 
on a Nissan Leaf. 
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Several actors may play a role in the provision of EV charging infrastructures, such as DSOs, suppliers or 
third parties who can use the charging points to sell electricity. DSOs involvement in EV charging is 
different across MS as there is no common EU regulatory framework. In the Spanish model, most DSOs 
deploy the charging infrastructure while the commercial operation is open to retailers. In Ireland, the DSO 
is involved, but the assets have not yet been included in the regulated asset base. Costs have been 
recovered via the distribution tariffs but are kept in a separate company and account. In the Czech 
Republic EV public charging infrastructure is built, owned and managed through competitive tenders 
mostly pushed by the three biggest energy utilities while DSOs are only in charge for the connection (EDSO, 
2018). For more information on EV charging infrastructure regulation, see Meeus and Schittekatte 
(2018b). 
Data management  
Data management comprises ‘the processes by which data is sourced, validated, stored, protected and 
processed and by which it can be accessed by suppliers or customers’, according to the EC impact 
assessment (EC, 2016e). 
 
Data access and management is a key enabler for the operation of electricity markets. There are currently 
different data management models across EU MS, as presented in CEER, (2016); decentralised, partially 
centralised or fully centralised. Categories of the data management models are described as follows: 
 
• A fully centralised model comprises a centralisation of all key aspects related to data 
management. A typical centralised model is a data hub, where all data is retrieved, validated, 
stored, protected, processed, distributed and accessed. In this model DSOs, market actors and all 
consumers relate to the data hub. 
 
• A partially centralised model involves centralisation of one of the key aspects of data 
management, typically distribution and access to data. It is rather a communications hub that 
provides a common access point for data that could be stored in several databases, at DSOs or 
metering points. 
 
• A decentralised model, or DSO model, typically means that all the key aspects of data 
management are decentralised, meaning that they are the responsibility of the DSO. A typical 
decentralised model would be a standardised message exchange system or another cruder way 
of connecting market actors with DSOs. 
 
In Europe, Denmark currently operates a centralised data hub with storage. The Netherlands has a partially 
centralised model, with centralised communications with multiple databases. Spain, and Italy have 





Figure 16: Responsible parties for access to metering data, based on (EC, 2018b) 
Figure 16 gives an overview of the different data management models in Europe. Germany, which has a 
combination of models, is considered as a decentralised (DSO) model in the figure. In fact, a metering 
point operator, which can be a DSO, is responsible for third-party access to metering data in Germany.  
2.3. Increased expectations for DSOs in their traditional roles 
In this subsection, we will present three new responsibilities that the CEP assigns for the DSOs.  
2.3.1.  Proposal for DSOs network planning  
On the introduction of distribution network planning, the newly added recital (42) of the Commission E-
Directive states that ‘(..) Member States should also introduce network development plans for distribution 
systems in order to support the integration of generating installations using renewable energy sources, 
facilitate the development of storage facilities and the electrification of the transport sector, and provide 
to system users adequate information regarding the foreseen expansions or upgrades of the network, as 
currently such procedure does not exist in the majority of Member States.’ 
 
The Commission proposal for the E-Directive requires that DSOs prepare and implement multi-annual 
development plans and to coordinate with TSOs on such multi-annual development plans. It adds in article 
32(2) that ‘the development of a distribution system shall be based on a transparent network development 
plan that distribution system operators shall submit every two years to the regulatory authority.’ Moreover 
‘the network development plan shall contain the planned investments for the next five to ten years, with 
particular emphasis on the main distribution infrastructure which is required in order to connect new 
generation capacity and new loads including re-charging points for electric vehicles.’ The development 
plan ‘shall also demonstrate the use of demand response, energy efficiency, energy storage facilities or 
other resources that a distribution system operator is using as an alternative to system expansion.’[sic] It 
adds that ‘the regulatory authority shall consult all current or potential system users on the network 
development plan. The regulatory authority shall publish the result of the consultation process on the 
proposed investments.’ For DSOs serving less than 100,000 connected consumers, or serving isolated 
systems, MSs may decide not to apply these obligations. 
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The Commission and Council proposals for the introduction of DSO network planning agree on its 
necessity, but there is some disagreement over the details regarding the submission and publication of 
network plans by the DSOs as well as for public consultation process on the network development plan 
and on the proposed investments. 
 
The Council position ensures the greater involvement of NRAs and TSOs in the network development. It 
adds in article 32(2) that the DSOs should submit and publish the network development plan, to both 
NRAs and TSOs every two years. It also tasks the DSOs with conducting the public consultation with 
relevant system users on the network development plan instead of NRAs as stated in article 32(2a). 
Stakeholders’ positions  
EURELECTRIC, (2017b) welcomes ‘the initiative to describe the grid needs and how DSOs will address them, 
including through flexibility solutions when they are available and economically efficient.’ However, it does 
not agree with the two-year cycle for the submission of such a plan and considers that it is up to ‘Members 
States to decide on the review cycle of the network development plan considering the situation of the 
already deployed distribution network infrastructure.’ For the consultation process, EURELECTRIC states 
that ‘it is inappropriate to define a harmonised consultation process for DSOs’ development plan at EU 
level given the large number of national specificities. The consultation should be defined by Member States 
and should not be mandatory.’  
 
ACER and CEER, (2017b) also welcome ‘the proposal for DSO network plans’.  However, they add that the 
E-Directive and E-Regulation ‘should require DSOs and TSOs, instead of NRAs, to consult stakeholders on 
their network plans and take responsibility for their quality. This reflects the fact that DSOs should engage 
with and respond to the reasonable needs of their stakeholders.’ 
 
On distribution network planning, SEDC, Solar Power Europe, Wind Europe and other signatories of the 
joint position paper SEDC et al., (2017) have stated that rules must be established for ensuring market 
access for consumers and third parties, through creating ‘a comprehensive framework for grid monitoring, 
so as to increase the visibility of flexibility, including demand-side flexibility. It should be based on 
information that TSOs and DSOs would publish regularly as regards to the performance of their networks, 
in particular the volumes and sources of curtailed energy. Comprehensive reporting on grid evolution, 
together with appropriate tariff structure, will be an essential basis for cost-effective network 
management and enable the targeted acquisition of flexibility services from the market by system 
operators instead of CAPEX only investments.’ 
Commission proposal 
- A requirement for DSOs to prepare and implement multi-annual development plans and coordinate 
with TSOs on their development. 
- The network development plan shall be submitted every two years by DSOs to the regulatory 
authority. 
- The network development plan shall contain the planned investments for the next five to ten years. 
- For DSOs serving less than 100,000 connected consumers, or serving isolated systems, MSs may 
decide not to apply these obligations. 
- NRAs should undertake a public consultation on the proposed investment in the network plans. 
Council position 
- A higher involvement of NRAs and TSOs in the network development plans. 







They also believe that ‘there should not be an exemption in Article 32 of the Electricity Directive for 
integrated utility DSOs developing a network plan. Likewise, small DSOs should not be exempt in Article 
32(2) - instead there should be an approach that gives the National Regulatory Authority discretion in 
defining the requirements for a small DSO.’ 
 
REScoop, (2017b) states that the federation relies ‘on transparency from, and the ability to have 
constructive dialogue with, DSOs in order to assess opportunities for rolling out different activities and 
investment.’ It welcomes the ‘proposed requirements for DSOs to develop network development plans. 
However, all DSOs – even small ones – should have this requirement. Provisions on distribution network 
planning should also be strengthened to ensure REScoops and other stakeholders have sufficient 
opportunity to input into the DSO’s plan as it develops. Such engagement will better enable DSOs to identify 
new opportunities to achieve savings and other system benefits through cooperation with REScoops.’ 
 
On the other hand, EDSO for Smart Grid states, in its amendments proposed for the E-Directive  (EDSO, 
2017b), that ‘network development plans for all voltage levels are unnecessary and would result in onerous 
costs and administrative burden of little additional value, overlapping with current regulations ensuring 
quality of supply. Therefore, the obligation for network development plans should be limited to high-
voltage networks only, where grid planning timeframes match development plans and their costs might 
be appropriate in relation to the benefits.’ 
2.3.2. Proposal for DSOs flexibility services procurement  
The CEP aims to define the conditions under which DSOs may acquire flexibility services 47  without 
distorting the markets for such services. It includes clear provisions that will enable DSOs to manage local 
grid issues and enhance the security of supply (SoS) through flexibility procurement.  
DSOs flexibility services procurement process 
Regarding the regulatory framework of the distribution system operators for the procurement of 
flexibility, article 32(1) of the E-Directive requires MSs to define the exact regulatory framework including 
incentives for DSOs and adequate remuneration. It states that ‘Member States shall provide the necessary 
regulatory framework to allow and incentivise distribution system operators to procure services in order 
to improve efficiencies in the operation and development of the distribution system, including local 
congestion management’. It adds that ‘distribution system operators shall be adequately remunerated for 
the procurement of such services in order to recover at least the corresponding expenses.’ 
Article 32(2) of the Commission E-Directive on ‘tasks of distribution system operators in the use of 
flexibility’ states that DSOs shall define standardised market products48 for the services procured while 
ensuring effective participation of all market participants including renewable energy sources, demand 
response, and aggregators. Distribution system operators shall exchange all necessary information and 
coordinate with TSOs. The same article also requires DSOs to consider flexibility services in grid planning: 
‘the network development plan shall also demonstrate the use of demand response, energy efficiency, 
energy storage facilities or other resources that distribution system operator is using as an alternative to 
system expansion.’ 
                                                           
47 Regarding the DSO role in balancing the system, the EU CEP has not foreseen the procurement of frequency ancillary services 
(Frequency Containment Reserves (FCR), Frequency Restoration Reserves (FRR) and Replacement Reserves (RR)) by DSOs. The 
flexibility services, that DSOs may procure, have been limited to non-frequency ones and congestion management services. 
48 For balancing, standardised products, according to the EBGL, mean harmonised balancing products defined by all TSOs for the 




To ensure a smooth introduction of DSOs’ procurement of flexibility services, the CEP proposes a market-
based approach49 while ensuring a TSO/DSO coordination. Indeed, article 32(1) says that ‘distribution 
system operators shall procure these services according to transparent, non-discriminatory and market-
based procedures.’  
 
The Council proposal for E-Directive adds, in article 32(1a), a higher NRAs oversight in the definition of 
market products specifications for the flexibility services procured. The Council proposal removed the 
obligation of a market-based procurement of flexibility service. 
Coordination with TSOs in the procurement of flexibility services 
Using system flexibility services will require extensive cooperation and clear boundaries between TSOs 
and DSOs. This aims to ensure an efficient data exchange on the activated flexibility resources and to avoid 
a double activation from a DSO and a TSO of the same flexibility source. According to article 32(1) of the 
E-Directive, ‘distribution system operators shall exchange all necessary information and coordinate with 
transmission system operators in order to ensure the optimal utilisation of resources, ensure the secure 
and efficient operation of the system and facilitate market development.’ 
 
In addition, for the access flexibility resources, article 53(2) of the E-Regulation states that ‘transmission 
and distribution system operators shall cooperate in order to achieve coordinated access to resources such 
as distributed generation, energy storage or demand response that may support particular needs of both 
the distribution system and the transmission system.’ 
 
 shows the new system approach for flexibility provision. 
 
 
Figure 17: A one system approach for flexibility procurement, source: (EC, 2017c) 
                                                           
49 Market-based flexibility is a process whereby flexibility is obtained and priced through a (separate) market mechanism from all 
stakeholders that are a source of flexibility, benefit from it, or have a controlling role, i.e. consumers, producers, BRP, system 
operators and regulators.  
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 Stakeholders’ positions  
Regarding DSOs procurement of flexibility services, EURELECTRIC, (2017b) states that it welcomes the 
initiative to propose a regulatory framework that ‘allows and incentivises DSOs to procure flexibility 
services which may complement or obviate the need to upgrade or replace electricity capacity and which 
supports both the efficiency and secure operation of the distribution system.’ Also, EURELECTRIC welcomes 
‘the definition of standardised products by DSOs for the services procured. These services should be defined 
in such a way that electric vehicles can offer their flexibility services in this flexibility market – which also 
means that infrastructure able to modulate the charging process has to become the standard.’ It also 
agrees ‘with the provision to foresee the adequate remuneration to DSOs for the procurement of flexibility 
services.’ 
 
CEER and ACER, (2017g) support the proposals for the use of flexibility by DSOs to manage the distribution 
system. They state that DSOs ‘should be required to act in a non-discriminatory manner when procuring 
and using flexibility, and, in this context, adequate unbundling is essential.’ Additionally, ‘the use of 
flexibility by DSOs should not be exclusive, and should allow the provider of flexibility to take advantage of 
other arrangements for valuing flexibility e.g. through participation in the balancing market.’ 
  
EDSO, (2017b) states that ‘DSOs should not be limited to procuring flexibility on the market but instead 
need to have the choice to do it themselves to account for those situations when the market service cannot 
be immediately available or it is more expensive. In those situations where DSOs procure flexibility on the 
market, then transparent, non-discriminatory and market-based procedures should be applied.’ On the 
standardised products, it adds that the ‘standardisation of market products does not stand in the way of 
innovation and dynamic product development. As flexibility markets do not exist yet for DSOs, it is 
important at this early stage to define standardised definitions (common language, terms, and definitions) 
regarding flexibility products. Once these definitions are put in place and before harmonising these 
products at national level, we believe that market parties should find out the best possible solution in order 
to allow for the development of innovative solutions.’ 
 
ENTSO-E is, however, concerned about a possible market fragmentation due to the DSO definition of 
standard flexibility products (ENTSO-E, 2017c). It states that ‘this task cannot be considered as the 
exclusive DSO area, given the growing need for coordinated use of flexibility in more and more 
interdependent transmission-distribution system and integrated retail market-wholesale market.’ It adds 
that ‘flexibility products and associated market rules should be designed with DSOs, TSOs and market 
parties, in an integrated manner with balancing. Limiting it to DSOs will result in market fragmentation 
and loss of value for consumers.’ 
  
Commission proposal 
-MSs shall provide the necessary regulatory framework to allow and incentivise DSOs to procure 
flexibility services. 
-DSOs shall define standardised market products. 
-DSOs to consider flexibility services in grid planning. 
-The procurement of flexibility services shall be market-based while ensuring the TSO/DSO 
coordination. 
Council position 
-A higher NRAs oversight in the definition of market products specifications. 




Wind Europe, (2017) states that ‘DSOs should be incentivised to make use of smart grid equipment that 
can improve their visibility on the flexibility resources connected to their network, instead of relying on 
costly and time-consuming grid expansion. Their deployment should be considered as part of TSOs and 
DSOs long-term network development plan, and encouraged through performance-based tariff (cf. UK RIIO 
model).’ 
 
For REScoop, the requirements for national regulation enabling DSOs to procure flexibility services ‘could 
provide REScoops with new local market opportunities. However, the provisions need to be clarified to 
ensure that standardisation of flexibility products does not result in the exclusion of LECs’ (REScoop, 2017c). 
2.4. Limiting the role of DSOs in emerging businesses  
EV charging and storage facilities are emerging businesses in the electricity sector. The CEP aims to 
establish a regulatory framework for limiting the DSOs’ roles in these businesses when their involvement 
is not necessary. 
2.4.1. Limiting DSOs’ ownership of EV charging facilities  
DSOs, according to recital 42 of the E-Directive, have to cost-efficiently integrate electric vehicles. The 
distribution network development plans, submitted every two years to NRAs, should include the planned 
investments for the next five to ten years covering, inter alia, re-charging points for electric vehicles.  
 
MSs are in charge of providing the necessary regulatory framework facilitating the connection of public 
and private EV charging facilities to the distribution networks. According to article 33(1) of the E-Directive, 
each MS shall ensure that DSOs ‘cooperate on a non-discriminatory basis with any undertaking that owns, 
develops, operates or manages recharging points for electric vehicles, including with regard to connection 
to the grid.’ 
Derogation for EV charging facilities ownership by DSOs 
Both the Commission and Council proposals introduce limitations for DSOs ownership of EV charging 
facilities while, at the same time, they both include derogations that may be given. The EC promotes a 
market-based solution for the ownership of EV charging infrastructure and  provides a derogation for DSOs 
ownership as a last resort and under certain conditions. Article 33(2) of The Commission E-Directive states 
that: 
 
‘(2) Member States may allow distribution system operators to own, develop, manage or operate 
recharging points for electric vehicles only if the following conditions are fulfilled: 
(a) other parties, following an open and transparent tendering procedure, have not expressed their 
interest50 to own, develop, manage or operate recharging points for electric vehicles; 
(b) the regulatory authority has granted its approval. 
(3) Articles 3551 and 5652 shall apply to distribution system operators engaged in ownership, development, 
operation or management of recharging points.53 
(4) Member States54 shall perform at regular intervals or at least every five years a public consultation in 
order to re-assess the potential interest of market parties to own, develop, operate or manage recharging 
points for electric vehicles. In case the public consultation indicates that third parties are able to own, 
                                                           
50 The words ‘have not expressed their interest’ were changed into ‘could not be awarded with a right‘ in the Council position. 
51 Article 35 on unbundling of distribution system operators. 
52 Article 56 on unbundling of accounts.  
53 This unbundling provision was removed in the Council position. 




develop, operate or manage such points, Member States shall ensure that distribution system operators' 
activities in this regard are phased-out.’ 
 
 
Stakeholders’ positions  
The EURELECTRIC, (2017b) position paper on the E-Directive welcomes ‘the European Commission’s quest 
for opening up the EV charging market’. However, it states that ‘in cases where DSOs are engaged in the 
roll-out of the necessary charging infrastructure, it should be guaranteed that they can recover the costs 
incurred, also and notably if the activity of the DSO on this field is phased out. This is especially of 
importance for DSOs in those countries that currently have opted for a roll-out of charging infrastructure 
with the help of DSOs. It should be made clear that DSOs in any case are only owning and technically 
operating the charging infrastructure as an extension of their regulated role. The commercial operation of 
the charging stations should always be done by market participants.’ 
 
ACER and CEER, (2017b) state, regarding DSOs ownership of both EV and storage infrastructure, that the 
rule on ‘network operators not owning and operating storage or electric vehicles in Articles 33, 36 and 54 
of the Electricity Directive is welcome. However, the derogation process should be clarified to provide more 
certainty to market investors – to the benefit of consumers and businesses – and to deliver a more efficient 
use of regulatory resources in assessing exemption applications.’ 
 
EDSO, (2017c) proposal for amendments of the E-Directive states that ‘DSOs should be involved in the 
planning of EV infrastructure since public recharging stations will impact the operation of the distribution 
system.’ It adds that ‘DSOs need to have regulatory certainty that they can recover any costs incurred 
(avoided stranded costs and stranded investments), should these activities be handed to a free commercial 
market party at a later point in time.’ 
2.4.2. Limiting DSOs ownership of storage facilities 
 
Article 36 of the E-Directive sets the Commission provisions with regards to DSOs ownership of storage 
facilities. It states that DSOs shall not be allowed to own, develop, manage or operate energy storage 
facilities. However, derogations may be granted. 
Derogation for storage facilities ownership by DSOs 
Derogation can be granted, according to article 36(2) by a MSs only if the following conditions are 
fulfilled; 
‘(a) other parties, following an open and transparent tendering procedure, have not expressed their 
interest to own, develop, manage or operate storage facilities; 
Commission proposal 
-Promoting market-based incentives for the ownership of EV charging infrastructure. 
-Continuous market monitoring to enhance market functioning and increase competition. 
-MSs may allow DSOs ownership of EV charging infrastructure under certain condition. 
Council position 
-The unbundling provision, among the conditions for obtaining a derogation for DSOs, was removed.  





(b) such facilities are necessary for the distribution system operators to fulfil its obligations under this 
regulation for the efficient, reliable and secure operation of the distribution system; and 
(c) the regulatory authority has assessed the necessity of such derogation taking into account the 
conditions under points (a) and (b) of this paragraph and has granted its approval.’ 
 
The Council position adds an extra derogation for DSOs to own storage facilities in article 36. It states that 
‘Member States may allow distribution system operators to own, develop, manage or operate energy 
storage facilities which are fully integrated network components 55  and the regulatory authority has 
granted its approval OR if all of the following conditions are fulfilled: 
(-a) such facilities are necessary for the distribution system operators to fulfil their obligations under this 
Directive for the efficient, reliable and secure operation of the distribution system and they are not used to 
buy or sell electricity to the wholesale market, including balancing markets;  
(a) other parties, following an open, transparent and non-discriminatory tendering procedure, subject to 
review and approval by the regulatory authority have not been awarded with a right to own, develop, 
manage or operate such facilities. Regulatory authorities may draw up guidelines or procurement clauses 
to help distribution system operators ensure a fair tendering procedure; and  
(c) the regulatory authority has assessed the necessity of such derogation and has carried out an 
assessment of the tendering procedure, including the conditions, and has granted its approval.’ 
Public consultation and third parties access 
‘Regulatory authorities56 shall perform at regular intervals or at least every five years a public consultation 
in order to re-assess the potential interest of market parties to invest, develop, operate or manage energy 
storage facilities’, according to article 36(4). In case the public consultation indicates that third parties can 
own, develop, operate or manage such facilities, Member States shall ensure that distribution system 
operators' activities in this regard are phased-out. 
 
The Council proposal adds to the same article that the phase-out shall be done within 24 months. Also, 
‘NRAs may allow the distribution system operators to receive reasonable compensation, in particular to 
recover the residual value of the investment they made into energy storage facilities.’ 
 
 
                                                           
55 Here, ‘fully integrated network components’ means static network components that are integrated in the transmission or 
distribution system, including storage facilities, and are used for the sole purpose of ensuring a secure and reliable operation of 
the transmission or distribution system but not for balancing nor congestion management, article 2(39a) of the Council position 
of the E-Directive. 
56 According to the Council position, the monitoring can be done by the distribution system operators or the regulatory authority. 
Commission proposal 
-DSOs may invest in storage when no market party expresses interest to own, develop, manage or 
operate storage facilities in a competitive tendering process. 
-Public consultation to be done by NRAs regarding market parties’ interest in the ownership of 
storage facilities. 
Council position 
-Addition of an extra derogation for DSOs to own storage facilities. 
-Public consultation to be done by NRAs or DSOs regarding market parties availability and interest in 




Stakeholders’ positions  
EURELECTRIC partly supports the Commission proposals in EURELECTRIC, (2017b). It favours ‘a tendering 
procedure to assess whether DSOs should be allowed to own, develop, manage or operate energy storage 
facilities because in principle energy storage facilities shall be owned, developed, managed or operated by 
market participants’. However, it states that a mandatory tendering procedure ‘could be both costly and 
time consuming and not appropriate for every situation.’ Therefore, EURELECTRIC proposes an 
amendment under which ‘DSOs should be allowed to own, develop, manage or operate energy storage 
facilities if 1) following an assessment of the market the NRA concludes that no tendering procedure is 
needed and gives its approval or 2) if following a tender/market test performed in an open and transparent 
manner under NRAs’ supervision, no parties have expressed interest to own, develop, manage or operate 
the storage facilities.’  
 
CEER & ACER took the same position, for storage facilities ownership as for EV charging infrastructure, 
requiring further clarification of the derogation process. They welcome ‘the requirements in Article 36 for 
National Regulatory Authorities to carry out a public consultation on the derogation process, and the 
requirement for the Member State to require network companies to phase out activities in owning and 
operating storage’ (ACER and CEER, 2017b). 
 
EDSO, (2017c) proposal for amendments of the E-Directive states, with regards to the ownership of 
storage facilities, that ‘article 36 should not exclude DSOs’ right to storage ownership and operation for 
ensuring network security and secure operations. Whereas storage services should remain a market 
activity, there are some particular situations that require technical solutions without the need of the DSOs 
of having to go to the market to ask for such services. These technical situations include voltage control, 
reactive power control, emergency situations, maintenance, voltage limits and reactive power control.’ 
 
The signatories of SEDC et al., (2017), including SEDC, Solar Power Europe, and Wind Europe, have 
emphasised the need to ‘establish a constructive framework for energy storage which takes into account 
the specificity of the energy storage technologies, and recognises that TSOs and DSOs should not own, 
develop, manage or operate storage assets, unless a market-based procurement based on an open and 
transparent tendering procedure is proven of not being possible and is regularly reviewed.’ 
 
The BEUC, (2017a) policy paper indicates that ‘when operating outside of their natural monopoly role, e.g. 
in energy storage, the DSOs need to be strongly regulated in order not to limit competition in the energy 
market.’ 
2.4.3. Neutral DSOs role in data management 
Article 34 of the E-Directive on ‘tasks of distribution system operators in data management’ states that 
MSs shall ensure that data eligible parties57 have non-discriminatory, clear and equal access to data. 
Indeed, in MSs where smart meters are implemented according to article 19 and DSOs are involved in 
data management, compliance programmes, ensuring that discriminatory conduct is excluded, shall 
include specific measures to exclude discriminatory access to data from eligible parties as provided for in 
article 23. The same article adds that where DSOs are not subject to article 35(1), (2) and (3), on 
unbundling of DSOs, ‘Member States shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the vertically 
integrated undertaking do not have privileged access to data for the conduct of its supply activity.’ 
                                                           
57  According to article 23 of the E-Directive, ‘eligible parties shall include at least customers, suppliers, transmission and 




Stakeholders’ positions  
On DSOs’ access to data, EURELECTRIC states that ‘regardless of the data management model adopted, 
DSOs and suppliers should have unrestricted access to customers’ data needed to fulfil their legal and 
regulatory liabilities (security of supply, billing, switching etc.), as per their contractual obligations. For any 
other additional service, access to metering and consumption data should be possible only after the explicit 
consent of the customer. The General Data Protection Regulation (EU 2016/679)58 introduces very precise 
rules and obligations about consumer consent and we think the Electricity Directive should be aligned’ 
(EURELECTRIC, 2017b). 
 
EDSO, (2017c) indicates that ‘the provisions in Article 23 should not prevent the DSOs from accessing all 
necessary data from the customers, including metering and consumption data, not only for a safe grid 
operation, but also for continuing to promote real market facilitation. DSOs’ access to customers should 
comply with EU data protection regulation which already provides exemptions regarding customers’ 
consent in some cases. Moreover, customers’ consent should be arranged in standardised contracts, and 
any delivery of information to third parties will only be carried out based on explicit customers’ consent.’ 
2.5. EU DSO entity  
In this subsection, we will present the proposed procedures for the establishment of the EU DSO entity 
and its expected tasks. They are currently represented by different organisations as introduced at the 
beginning of this chapter in 2.1. 
2.5.1. Establishment of the EU DSO entity 
The CEP E-Regulation defines the EU DSO entity establishment procedure. The Commission stresses that 
the DSOs that are to form part of the DSO entity should be ‘unbundled’, a requirement that has been 
removed in the Council position. Indeed, article 49 of the Commission E-Regulation states that DSOs 
‘which are not part of a vertically integrated undertaking or which are unbundled according to the 
provisions of Article 35 [recast of Directive 2009/72/EC as proposed by COM(2016) 864/2], shall cooperate 
at Union level through a European Entity for Distribution system operators (‘EU DSO entity’), in order to 
promote the completion and functioning of the internal market in electricity, (…).’ Moreover, ‘distribution 
system operators who wish to participate in the EU DSO entity shall become registered members of the 
entity.’  
 
Article 50 of the Commission E-Regulation on Establishment of the EU DSO entity for electricity sets the 
different establishment steps: 
 
‘1.By [OP: twelve months after entry into force], the distribution system operators, with the administrative 
support of the Agency, shall submit to the Commission and to the Agency the draft statutes, a list of 
registered members, the draft rules of procedure, including the rules of procedures on the consultation 
with ENTSO for Electricity and other stakeholders and the financing rules, of the EU DSO entity to be 
established. 
2.Within two months of receipt, the Agency, after formally consulting the organisations representing all 
stakeholders, in particular distribution system users, shall provide an opinion to the Commission on the 
draft statutes, the list of members and the draft rules of procedure. 
                                                           
58 It is a regulation on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). 
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3.The Commission shall deliver an opinion on the draft statutes, the list of members and the draft rules of 
procedure taking into account the opinion of the Agency provided for in paragraph 2, within three months 
of receipt of the opinion of the Agency. 
4.Within three months of the day of receipt of the Commission’s positive opinion, the distribution system 
operators shall establish the EU DSO entity and adopt and publish its statutes and rules of procedure. 
5.The documents referred to in paragraph 1 shall be submitted to the Commission and to the Agency in 
case of changes thereof or upon their reasoned request. The Agency and the Commission shall deliver an 
opinion in line with the process set out in paragraphs 2 to 4. 
6.The costs related to the activities of the EU DSO entity shall be borne by distribution system operators 
who are registered members and shall be taken into account in the calculation of tariffs. Regulatory 
authorities shall approve those costs only if they are reasonable and proportionate.’ 
 
The Council position proposes  a 9/9/9 composition of the EU DSO entity Board of Directors of which:  
 - 9 are representatives of members with more than 1 million grid users; 
 - 9 are representatives of members with more than 100,000 and less than 1 million grid users; 
 - 9 are representatives of members with less than 100,000 grid users. 
 
The Council adds further provisions on the establishment of the EU DSO entity. Its composition shall 
consist of, at least, a General Assembly, Board of Directors, Strategic Advisor Group, Expert Groups and a 
Secretary-General, according to article 50(0). 
 
Article (50a) of the Council position of the E-Regulation, on the rules and procedures for the EU DSO entity, 
adds rules for the decision-making process of the entity. Among the principles that the statutes of the 
entity should safeguard, we find: 
• The General Assembly adopts strategic decisions for the Board of Directors 
• Voting criteria for the entity decisions 
• Four years maximum duration of the Board of Directors elected by the General Assembly 
• The nomination of the President and the three Vice-Presidents by the Board of Directors 
• Decisions of the Board of Directors are adopted by simple majority of 15 votes 
• The Board of Directors may not consist of more than 3 representatives of members based in the 
same Member State or the same industrial group 
2.5.2. Tasks of the EU DSO Entity 
In this subsection, we will present the proposed aggregated tasks for the DSO entity, its cooperation with 
ENTSO-E and its role in drafting network codes. 
New aggregated tasks 
Article 51(1) of the Commission proposal for E-Regulation lists the tasks of the new EU DSO entity; 
‘(a) coordinated operation and planning of transmission and distribution networks; 
(b) integration of renewable energy resources, distributed generation and other resources embedded in 
the distribution network such as energy storage; 
(c) development of demand response; 
(d) digitalisation of distribution networks including deployment of smart grids and intelligent metering 
systems; 
(e) data management, cyber security and data protection; 




Article 51(2) of the E-Regulation also brings the following additional tasks: 
‘(a) cooperate with ENTSO for electricity on the monitoring of implementation of the network codes and 
guidelines which are relevant to the operation and planning of distribution grids and the coordinated 
operation of the transmission and distribution networks and which are adopted pursuant to this 
Regulation; 
(b) cooperate with ENTSO for electricity and adopt best practices on the coordinated operation and 
planning of transmission and distribution systems including issues such as exchange of data between 
operators and coordination of distributed energy resources; 
(c) work on identifying best practices on the areas identified in paragraph 1 and for the introduction of 
energy efficiency improvements in the distribution network;59 
(d) adopt an annual work programme and an annual report; 
(e) operate in full compliance with competition rules.’ 
 
The Council position in article 51(1) foresees the involvement the EU DSO entity in the proposed tasks, 
but with more precautions with regards to explicitly stating direct responsibilities for this new entity. 
Indeed, the proposed roles in the Council position have rather a facilitating nature, such as promoting the 
operation and planning of distribution networks60 and facilitating demand-side flexibility and response. 
Cooperation with ENTSO-E 
At the European level, the newly proposed DSO Entity ‘should closely cooperate with ENTSO for Electricity 
on the preparation and implementation of the network codes where applicable i.e. areas related to 
distribution networks’ as stated in recital 38 of the Commission proposal for E-Regulation. Moreover, the 
EU DSO entity shall cooperate with ENTSO-E on the coordinated operation and planning of transmission 
and distribution systems. 
 
Article 51(2) states that the EU DSO entity shall: 
‘(a)cooperate with ENTSO for electricity on the monitoring of implementation of the network codes and 
guidelines which are relevant to the operation and planning of distribution grids and the coordinated 
operation of the transmission and distribution networks and which are adopted pursuant to this 
Regulation; 
(b)cooperate with ENTSO for electricity and adopt best practices on the coordinated operation and 
planning of transmission and distribution systems including issues such as exchange of data between 
operators and coordination of distributed energy resources;’’ 
Network codes drafting 
Regarding the drafting of network codes, the Commission may require the EU DSO entity for electricity 
instead of the ENTSO-E to convene a drafting committee and submit a proposal for a network code to 
ACER if the matter is directly related to the operation of the distribution system and less relevant for the 
transmission system, as stated in article 55(2). 
 
The Council position changed the possible replacement of ENTSO-E by the DSO entity for network codes 
drafting into cooperation with ENTSO-E involving both entities. 
 
                                                           
59 The work on identifying best practices on the areas of the EU DSO entity tasks and for the introduction of energy efficiency 
improvements in the distribution network was removed in the Council position. 
60 The operation and planning of transmission networks was removed in the Council position. 
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Also, the EU DSO entity shall conduct a consultation in the development process of network codes, 
according to article 52 of the E-Regulation. This consultation process should be extensive, at an early stage 
of the development and done in a transparent and open manner for the relevant stakeholders, ‘in 
particular, the organisations representing all stakeholders61.’ This process ‘shall aim at identifying the 
views and proposals of all relevant parties during the decision-making process.’ 
 
In addition to that, ‘the EU DSO entity shall indicate how the observations received during the consultation 
have been taken into consideration. It shall provide reasons where observations have not been taken into 
account’, according to article 52(3). 
 
 
Stakeholders’ positions  
EURELECTRIC welcomes ‘the acknowledgement of the prominence of DSOs in the energy transition and 
the establishment of a EU DSO entity’ (EURELECTRIC, 2017c). It adds that ‘the scope of responsibilities of 
the DSO entity has to be carefully defined’ and that ‘MS must retain final responsibility for DSO activities 
within their national borders and markets. The DSO entity should be an expert organisation and should not 
engage in lobbying.’ Moreover, on the composition of the DSO entity, EURELECTRIC, (2017a) adds that 
‘since the decisions of the DSO entity apply to all DSOs (also smaller ones) EURELECTRIC suggests to ensure 
inclusivity of all DSOs in Europe, it therefore recommends that the membership criteria is widened to 
include all type of DSOs in Europe.’ Also, it states that ‘the ways in which the members of the DSO entity 
come to a decision (voting right) also have to be defined carefully. EURELECTRIC believes that a 
proportional representation of all participants in the EU DSO entity is most appropriate.’ 
 
CEER and ACER welcome the proposal for an EU-wide DSO entity, and for DSOs to produce network plans 
which feed into TSO plans. This will help deliver a holistic system approach. It adds that ‘ENTSO-E and the 
proposed EU DSO entity should have an obligation to co-ordinate with one another in Article 53 of the 
                                                           
61 ‘That consultation shall also involve national regulatory authorities and other national authorities, supply and generation 
undertakings, system users including customers, distribution system operators, including relevant industry associations, technical 
bodies and stakeholder platforms’, according to article 52(1). 
Commission proposal 
- The DSO entity will reinforce the DSOs representation at the European level. 
- The DSO entity will be involved in the development of EU rules such as network codes. 
- The DSO entity will cooperate with ENTSO-E on issues of mutual concern, such as data 
management, balancing, planning, congestion, etc. 
 - The DSO entity will work on areas such as DSO/TSO cooperation, integration of RES, deployment of 
smart grids, demand response, digitalisation and cybersecurity. 
Council position 
- More detailed provisions on the establishment of the EU DSO entity, its board members and the 
decision-making process. 
- Supportive and facilitating nature of the DSO entity tasks, such as promoting the operation and 
planning of distribution networks and facilitating demand-side flexibility and response. 
- Changing the possible replacement of ENTSO-E by the DSO entity for network codes drafting into 
cooperation with ENTSO-E. 





Electricity Regulation, and this mutual obligation should also be reflected in Article 27’ (ACER and CEER, 
2017b). 
 
EDSO (2017a), also supports the setting up of a DSO entity and states that ‘the setting-up of a dedicated 
body for electricity DSOs is welcome. DSOs remain strongly committed to proactively contribute to the 
future developments with regards to the new entity’s governance, structure and functioning. However, it 
must be ensured that the costs related to the activities of the EU DSO entity are taken into account within 
the regulatory framework. We suggest to include a separate article concerning the costs of the EU DSO 
entity, in line with the relevant TSO rules for the establishment of ENTSO-E (Article 30).’ 
 
ENTSO-E welcomes this EU DSO entity ‘as a way to enhance EU-level TSO-DSO cooperation, based on the 
achievements of the current TSO-DSO platform. However, the topics listed in the regulation should not be 
the sole responsibility of the EU DSO entity, since close cooperation with TSOs and market parties should 
be a priority from the beginning of the process. The TSO-DSO platform should be used as an important 
cooperation place.’ It adds that ‘digitalisation of the grid and development of smart grids cannot be limited 
to distribution, and should be addressed for the whole system. We need to bear in mind that digitalisation 
provides solutions to both DSOs and TSOs’ (ENTSO-E, 2017d). 
 
Wind Europe also welcomes the proposal ‘to form an EU DSO body with a legal role. As such, the DSOs 
should be further involved in network planning and network operation, to ensure an optimised operation 
of the system.’ It adds that ‘it is important that this new entity remains a technical body and does not 
engage in advocacy activities. There should be a formal, transparent and inclusive cooperation with those 
associations representing system users. ACER should oversee its formation and task.’ (Wind Europe, 2017). 
2.6. Interlinkage with Network Codes 
We will present in this part the increasing stakeholders’ involvement in network codes development and 
the newly proposed adoption process. 
2.6.1.  Stakeholders’ roles in network codes 
In Table 3, we introduce the changes in different stakeholders’ roles according to the CEP with regards to 
the different interaction levels: 
 
Table 3: Changes in NC development process and stakeholders' involvement, combined from (EC, 2016e) and (Groebel, 2017) 
Interaction 
level 





Based on ACER’s framework 
guideline, ENTSO-E drafts network 
code (strong ENTSO-E role and 
influence). ACER provides opinion 
and recommendation to the 
Commission.  
Based on ACER’s framework guideline, ENTSO-E 
drafts a network code guided by a standing 
stakeholder body and broad general stakeholder 
involvement. ACER consolidates the network code 
and submits the final document to the Commission. 
Oversight of 
ENTSO-E 
Limited ACER oversight of ENTSO-E Strengthened ACER oversight of ENTSO-E62 
                                                           
62 This entails strengthening ACER's role in the development of NC, particularly giving it more responsibility in elaborating and 




new entities  
None or limited regulatory 
oversight (limited rules in network 
codes and guidelines)  





Lack of clear European mission and 
voluntary transparency rules  
Codified clear European mission and transparency 
obligations on its decision-making64  
DSO  European DSOs collaborate 
through the existing DSO 
associations but without any legal 
status at EU institutional level. 
There is no formal participation in 
drafting or amending of network 
codes and guidelines  
Establishment of an EU DSO entity for electricity 
with an efficient working structure; European DSOs 
will provide experts based on calls for proposals 




of NC and 
Guidelines 
Adoption/amendments by 
implementing acts  
Adoption/amendments by delegated acts: The 
Commission shall consult national experts before 
adopting/amending a network code. 
2.6.2. The new adoption process for network codes  
The exercise of delegation in network codes and guidelines in the EU CEP 
The EU CEP provides the adoption of network codes by the European Commission as delegated acts 
instead of the current implementing acts. 
 
The EC exercise of delegation conditions in the CEP are stated in article 6365 of the E-Regulation for the 
establishment of network codes. The E-Regulation refers to the power to adopt delegated acts for network 
codes and guidelines adoption in article 55(1) for the establishment of network codes and in article 
56(1&4) for the amendment of network codes. 
 
According to EC, (2017c), the Commission's power to adopt delegated acts is subject to strict limits: 
• ‘the delegated act cannot change the essential elements of the law 
• the legislative act66 must define the objectives, content, scope, and duration of the delegation of 
power 
• Parliament and Council may revoke the delegation or express objections to the delegated act’ 
 
                                                           
63 ACER would receive additional competence to oversee new entities and functions which are not currently subject to regulatory 
oversight at EU level. NRAs cooperate with one another in ACER’s board of regulators, which is the locus of cooperation. 
64 Aiming to distinguish ENTSO-E’s statutory mandate from defending its member companies' interests by setting out a clear 
European mandate in the legislation and ensuring more transparency in its decision-making processes. 
65 The E-Regulation refers also to the empowerment of the EC to adopt delegated in other areas; article 31(3) concerning the 
geographical area covered by each ROC, article 46(4) on Inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism and article 
59(11) on the adoption of guidelines for the application of the exemption of new DC interconnectors revenues uses. 
66 Regulation, directive or decision. 
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The Commission prepares and adopts delegated acts after consulting expert groups67, composed of MSs 
representatives, which meet on a regular or occasional basis. Citizens and other stakeholders can provide 
feedback on the draft text of a delegated act during a four-week period. Once the Commission has adopted 
the act, the Parliament and the Council have two months to formulate any objections. If they do not, the 
delegated act enters into force. According to EC (2009), the Commission carries out the necessary 
preparatory steps from a political and institutional point of view to ensure that no objections will be made 
by Parliament or the Council. In case of an objection raised by one of these European institutions, the 
delegated act is revoked and cannot enter into force. Then the Commission can either adopt a new 
delegated act or amend where necessary while taking into account the expressed objections. If the 
objections are based on the fact that the Commission has overstepped the powers delegated to it, the EC 
can also present a legislative proposal under the terms of the Treaties (EC, 2009). Another possibility, in 
case of objection, is that the Commission will decide not to do anything at all. 
Amendments of network codes 
The newly added article 56(1) on ‘amendments of network codes’ states that: ‘the Commission is 
empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 63 concerning the amendment of network 
codes following the procedure under Article 55. Amendments can also be proposed by the Agency under 
the procedure set out in paragraphs 2 to 4 of this Article.’ 
 
Draft amendments to network codes may be proposed to ACER by the different concerned stakeholders68. 
Article 56(2) defines them as an entity or persons including ‘ENTSO-E, the EU DSO entity, TSOs, system 
users and consumers’. It also mentions that ‘ACER may also propose amendments on its own initiative’, as 
is stated in the same article of the E-Regulation. According to article 56(3), ‘the Commission is empowered 
to adopt, taking account of the Agency's proposals, amendments to any network code adopted under 
Article 55 as delegated acts in accordance with article 63.’ 
Council position on the adoption and amendment of network codes 
The Council position has removed the proposal for the Commission empowerment to adopt delegated 
acts for network codes and guidelines in article 63 of the E-Regulation. Article 55(1) of the Council E-
Regulation states that ‘the Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts in accordance with 
Article 62(2) in order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation.’ 
 
It has also removed the Commission empowerment to adopt delegated amendment of network codes and 
guidelines in article 63 of the E-Regulation and also adds a deadline for the Commission amendments. 
Indeed, article 56 of the Council E-Regulation states that ‘until 31 December 2025 the Commission is 
empowered to adopt implementing acts in accordance with Article 62(2) concerning the amendment of 
network codes within the areas listed in Article 55(1).’ According to the general approach adopted by the 
Council, by 2025 the Commission will develop a report evaluating the elements of existing network codes 
that could be included in EU acts concerning the internal electricity market.  
 
                                                           
67 EC requests specialist advice from outside experts as a basis for sound policymaking. This may be provided by groups of experts 
or external consultants, or take the form of studies. For more information, see EC (2016j). 
68 For more details on the development and amendment process of network codes as proposed in CEP, please consult a recording 






EURELECTRIC (2017a) welcomes the fact that ‘the EU DSO entity will be able to co-develop new NCs with 
ENTSO-E and ACER, where there is a clear and justified reason for NCs that have a DSO impact.’  It also 
emphasises the fact that the DSO entity should be involved in ‘developing the priority list for the NCs 
together with ACER and ENTSO-E.‘’  
 
Additionally, EURELECTRIC welcomes ‘the improvement of transparency and the will to involve 
stakeholders during the development phase of the NCs and guidelines.’ However, it believes that ‘the 
obligation to involve stakeholders in the drafting teams for NCs should be strengthened (the proposed 
Regulation only mentions “a limited number of affected stakeholders”). This is essential to ensure 
importance and efficiency of the provisions as well as an overall support for these texts for their adoption.’  
 
On the adoption of network codes, EURELECTRIC supports the EC ‘to adopt or amend new NCs and 
guidelines through delegated acts. However, EURELECTRIC emphasises the importance of involving 
stakeholders in the Expert Groups as part of a balanced comitology process with the aim to duly take into 
account the potential impact of the proposed delegated acts on the functioning of electricity markets and 
systems. The opinion of the Expert Groups should be highly considered by the Commission when adopting 
NCs and guidelines.’ 
 
EDSO, (2017a) agrees with the proposal for adopting network codes as delegated acts. On the focus areas 
of network codes, it also agrees with the EC empowerment to adopt delegated acts and adds that the 
Commission should take into account existing network codes, necessity and opportunity to lay down new 
network codes, and, if appropriate, geographical specificities.  
 
EDSO, however, disagrees with the adoption of guidelines at the EU level as delegated acts. It states that 
the ‘technical expertise necessary to the development of guidelines lies with stakeholder experts, which 
are involved in the process presented in Article 55. A secondary process involving delegated acts does not 
seem suitable, especially as the Commission itself does not possess sufficient technical expertise to develop 
guidelines. Guidelines should not be decided at the EU level via delegated acts.’ It adds that ‘as the network 
code development process is a lengthy and heavy one, the decision to start it anew should first consider 
existing provisions, real necessity for new codes and subsidiarity. Network codes are not the right tool to 
address the topics of cyber-security (implementation of the NIS Directive69) and distribution tariffs (related 
                                                           
69 The Directive on security of network and information systems.  
Commission proposal 
-Increased responsibilities for ACER in the stakeholders’ consultation of network codes for 
elaborating and submitting the final proposals to the Commission. 
-Maintaining ENTSO-E's role as a technical expert. 
-EC is empowered to adopt delegated acts on NC adoption and amendment. 
Council Position 
-Removing the EC empowerment to adopt delegated acts for network codes and guidelines adoption 
-Introduction of a deadline, 31 December 2025, for the Commission to adopt implementing acts, 
concerning the amendment of network codes within the areas listed in article 55(1). 
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to local conditions70). In addition to European network codes, more detailed rules should be fleshed out at 
national/local level.’ 
 
Wind Europe suggests that the proposed list of future network codes ‘should not lead to “a code per 
technology” approach. Both a regular and transparent process of maintenance of the network codes is 
needed in order to adequately reflect technical and regulatory progress in all aspects of the power system. 
The transformation of network codes into delegated acts should not jeopardise stakeholders’ participation. 
And relevant system users should be invited to participate in the drafting committees of future network 




                                                           
70 Due to the diversity of distribution tariffs across member states. 
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3. Empowering customers and citizens 
In this section, we set the scene by describing customer and citizen empowerment from demand response 
to energy communities. We then focus on key measures included in the CEP proposals to enable these 
kinds of initiatives. This includes new rights for active customers regarding self-consumption, smart 
metering, data access and management, and dynamic pricing. We also cover new rules to facilitate the 
market entry of new customer intermediaries, aggregators and (local) energy communities. 
3.1. Setting the scene: From Demand Response to energy communities 
According to EC, (2016e), the theoretical European potential of DR in 2016 adds up to about 100 GW and 
is expected to reach 160 GW in 2030. In almost all EU countries, the highest share of DR potential is in the 
residential sector. The potential increase will depend on the roll-out of flexible technologies integration 




Figure 18: Theoretical demand response potential 2030 (in MW), source: (EC, 2016b) 
In the same EC report, it is stated that the viable potential of demand response is limited to approximately 
30-40% of the theoretical one. This is due to the fact that not all facilities and devices can be technically 
controlled by the existing ICT and infrastructure (technical barrier) and due to the fact that only a 
proportion of the technically feasible potential can be used in a cost-efficient way (economical barrier). 
Also, there can be timing issues as the associated loads are unlikely to be available all at the same time. In 
2016, around 21 GW (out of the 100 GW potential) of DR participated in the market; 15 GW come from 
large industrial customers through direct market participation, while approximately 6 GW come from 
residential customers who are on dynamic pricing contracts. 
 
Demand response is actually a broad concept, ACER and CEER (2017) provides guidance on how to 
categorise DR. They divide DR into implicit or explicit: 
 
• Implicit DR is to be understood as end-consumers adapting their electricity consumption patterns to 
price without explicitly buying or selling in a market. An example is a dynamic electricity contract which 
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reflects the real or expected cost of electricity provision to the consumer (energy and/or network) in 
different time periods. Consumers are rewarded for their flexibility services by reducing their electricity 
bill. Implicit DR potential should be measured through an estimation of the capacity (MW) and volumes 
(MWh) available through it. This requires: 
 -Monitoring the percentage of customers equipped with smart meters 
 -The percentage of them with dynamic pricing contracts (hourly or shorter-term); and  
 -Assessing customers’ reaction to price signals  
 
• Explicit DR means that demand response is explicitly sold by consumers, directly (for large industrial 
ones) or through demand response service providers/aggregators (supplier or a third party) to the 
market or to grid operators. They are rewarded for their willingness to change their demand for 
electricity at a given point in time, usually in response to a specific system operator’s request. Explicit 
DR should be monitored, through the capacity (MW) contracted and volumes (MWh) sold into the 
different markets, in order to assess the flexibility share in each segment of the electricity market.  
 
Enabling both types of DR is necessary to address different consumer preferences. Some consumers, 
especially large ones, may engage in both types of DR for different applications and time-scales (SEDC, 
2017). Figure 19 give an overview of the sequence of the Demand-Side engagement. 
 
 
Figure 19: Demand-Side Engagement, source : (ACER, 2017) 
Next to DR, another important concept introduced in this section is energy communities. Energy 
communities are not a new concept. People tend to pull together in times of crisis, as it is possible to 
accomplish more in a group than alone. Through energy communities or cooperatives, they may engage 
in generation, distribution, aggregation, supply or storage services. REScoop, (2015), stated that after the 
economic crisis of 1929, private investors were very cautious about undertaking new investments, and 
this applied to the electricity sector as well. In the first decades of the last century, local governments and 
cooperatives of citizens filled in the electricity supply gaps throughout Europe, as private and public 
undertakings were slow in delivering electrification, especially for rural and isolated areas. Germany, for 
instance, was hit by a tidal wave of ‘electricity cooperatives’. Between 1895 and 1932, about 6,000 
electricity cooperatives were created in Germany. For many reasons, explained in the REScoop (2015), 
only about 50 are still in existence. After the 1973 oil crisis, the anti-nuclear and pro-environmental 
movements emerged. Enthusiastic ‘do it yourself’ builders constructed their first wind turbines in 
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Germany, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands and kept on collectively financing and exploiting them. As 
for their new regulatory framework, proposed in the CEP, several questions are worthy of discussion such 
as the local dimension of energy communities, being profit or value driven, and the provisions regarding 
grid management. 
3.2. New rights for active customers 
3.2.1. Self-consumption 
Current practices 
A very simple definition of active customers71, who are often referred to as prosumers, is that they are 
electricity customers that are engaged in the consumption and production of electricity. Other roles can 
be added to this definition, such as storage, demand response, and energy efficiency. Active consumers 
can be both household customers and non-household customers. However, with reference to the 3rd 
Energy Package, only a final customer can be an active customer, and wholesale customers do not qualify 
as active customers (Butenko, 2017a). Self-generation customers emerged in Europe more than two 
decades ago, and the number of electricity consumers has been slowly increasing. More recently, with the 
ongoing technological innovation (DER, batteries, smart metering...), prosumer roles have been expanding 
and prosumer numbers increasing rapidly. According to FSR (2017), in 2050 the European electricity 
system is expected to have millions of prosumers as well as electric vehicles and storage systems willing 
to provide energy and flexibility. 
 
The EC (2017e) study on residential prosumers in the European Energy Union states three main indicators 
against which national regulation for residential prosumers can be assessed: the legal basis or definition 
in the national regulation, generation/consumption elements and the power capacity cap reference. 
 
First, while most countries covered in the study define and regulate prosumers under different types of 
legislation, few of them do not have any legally binding definition. Belgium Flemish Region, Ireland, and 
Romania only have definitions developed by the energy distributor or system operator in private codes, 
which do not have any legally binding character. 
 
Second, there is the concept definition of prosumers or active customers with reference to consumption 
or production. Some MSs (Portugal, The Netherlands, France, Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Spain, and 
Lithuania) refer to self-consumption or auto-consumption. In Greece prosumers are characterised as self-
producers, instead of self-consumers. In Portugal, self-consumers are defined in relation to renewable 
energy as the persons who produce energy through renewable sources for self-consumption. In the 
Netherlands, the self-consumer definition is also related to renewable energy, while in France the 
production does not necessarily need to be from renewable energy sources. In Spain, self-consumption is 
defined as the ‘consumption of electric energy from generation installations that belong to the consumer 
or from installations that are connected to the consumer through a direct line of electric energy connected 
to the grid’, which form an interesting definition combining consumption, production, and connection to 
the grid. (EC, 2017d)EC (2017e) also indicates that this assessment indicator does not have any 
consequences for the quality of the support system to the corresponding prosumers. 
 
Third, MSs may also define residential prosumers in relation to the capacity of the installation by stating 
that it has to be below a certain threshold. For example, Ireland defines micro-generation as a source of 
                                                           
71 Note that three terms are used in the European Commission official documents with the same meaning, which are active 
customers, active consumers and prosumers. 20 to 30 years ago, the term prosumer was mainly used to refer to large industrial 
units with DG. 
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electrical energy that operates in parallel to the energy distributor and is rated up to 6kW at low voltage 
with single phase connection (230 Volt) and 11kW at low voltage with the three-phase connection. Some 
other MSs use the 10kW capacity as a threshold, such as Lithuania, Slovakia, Czech Republic and the 
Flemish system operator. A third group of MSs use a capacity cap of 100kW for defining residential 
prosumers such as Spain, Norway, and Romania. 
The CEP proposal for active customers 
The CEP aims to create a regulatory framework that copes with the new technological developments and 
puts consumers at the heart of the energy market. This will enable active consumer participation and 
ensure that they are protected and at the same time benefit from progress in energy technologies.  
 
The E-Directive recognises that ‘although consumers can generate and store electricity as well as manage 
their energy consumption more easily than ever, the current design of the retail market prevents them 
from being able to fully benefit from such opportunities and extends the level playing field in generation 
to the prosumers’. The E-Directive defines an ‘active customer’ as a ‘customer or a group of jointly acting 
customers who consume, store or sell electricity generated on their premises, including through 
aggregators, or participate in demand response or energy efficiency schemes provided that these activities 
do not constitute their primary commercial or professional activity.’ 
 
The active customer participation in the wholesale market is restricted to the sale of self-generated 
electricity and purchasing electricity for own use while not constituting a primary commercial activity. The 
situation is similar for ancillary services provision by active customers. They can place bids, ‘alone or 
through aggregation, to sell demand reduction or increase at a price in organized markets.’ The contract 
of a final customer with an aggregator, according to article 13 of the E-Directive, should be done directly, 
and without the prior consent of the energy supplier.  
 
Article 15(1) of the E-Directive ensures that active customers are entitled to access wholesale markets 
directly or through the aggregators ‘without being subject to disproportionately burdensome procedures 
and charges that are not cost reflective.’  Indeed, they shall be ‘subject to cost reflective, transparent and 
non-discriminatory network charges, accounting separately for the electricity fed into the grid and the 
electricity consumed from the grid, in line with Article 59(8)72’, (article 15(2)). Moreover, their installations 
‘may be managed by a third party for installation, operation, including metering and maintenance.’ Article 
17(1) requires NRAs to encourage consumers, including those offering demand response, through 
aggregators or not, to participate alongside generators in a non-discriminatory manner in all organised 
markets.  
 
The direct access to retail market for active customers is still not allowed in the CEP. Active customers 
cannot, according to the definition in article 2(6) supply their self-generated electricity to other end users. 
However, this is possible through aggregators, according to the definition in article 2(14). Table 4 describes 
the changes in market access for active customers in the CEP. It should be noted that the wholesale market 
for commodity refers to the trading of electricity, organised by Power exchanges. The wholesale market 
for services refers to flexibility services used for balancing or congestion management (i.e. reaction to the 
conditions on the market). It is a single buyer market, where TSOs (and in the future DSOs) contract these 
services. 
                                                           
72  Article 59(8): ‘With a view to increasing transparency in the market and provide to all interested parties all necessary 
information, decisions or proposals for a decision concerning transmission and distribution tariffs as referred in Article 60(3), 
regulatory authorities shall make available to market parties the detailed methodology and underlying costs used for the 
calculation of the relevant network tariffs.’ 
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Table 4: EU CEP impact on prosumers' Market Access, adapted from (Butenko, 2017b) 
 
 
The Council position is in line with the Commission regarding active customers, while grouping its different 
provisions from other articles of the E-Directive and E-Regulation regarding active customers rights and 
duties under article 15. It adds that MSs, with existing national schemes ‘not accounting separately for the 
electricity fed into the grid and the electricity consumed from the grid, shall grant no new rights under 
these schemes beyond the end of the year 2025’, as stated in article 15(1c) of the Council E-Directive. 
Stakeholders’ positions 
EURELECTRIC, (2017b) states that ‘the definition of active customers (as well as that of “renewable self-
consumer” in art. 2(a) of the Renewables Directive) should be clarified. “Their premises” could be 
interpreted as to mean that the provisions apply to different assets owned by the same consumer in 
different locations and result in a positive discrimination. Instead, the definition should clearly refer to 
generation and consumption of electricity behind the grid connection point.’ 
 
EURELECTRIC agrees with ‘the requirement to charge network tariffs separately for the offtake from the 
grid and injection to the grid (art. 15) separately and the reference to cost-reflectiveness of such network 
tariffs’. However, it thinks that ‘the provisions should be made clearer, so as to explicitly prevent net 
metering on any longer period than the settlement time, and not only for network charges but also for the 
Commission proposal 
-Active customers can be both household and non-household final customers. 
-Network tariffs should reflect the cost and value of the system infrastructure, including for active 
customers.  
-Market access of active customers is restricted to the sale of self-generated electricity, and the 
purchase of own usage electricity and shouldn’t constitute their primary commercial or professional 
activity. 
-Active customers can only access retail market through aggregator, which have the same 
requirements as energy suppliers. 
Council position 
-No new rights should be given to existing national schemes not accounting separately for the 




remaining elements of the customers’ bill, i.e., system costs & levies (policy support costs).’ Finally, 
EURELECTRIC agrees that ‘energy installation for the activity of active customers (beyond the meter) could 
be managed by third parties provided that it is clarified that metering activity should still be performed by 
the party that in each Member State is responsible for metering.’ 
 
ACER and CEER, (2017d) ask for more clarification concerning ‘cost reflective, transparent and non-
discriminatory network charges, accounting separately for the electricity fed into the grid and the 
electricity consumed from the grid’ to exclude the possibility of net metering. CEER & ACER propose that 
the definition of an ‘active customer’ should be further specified as a type of ‘final customer’. 
 
EDSO welcomes the customers’ right to self-consumption in the E-Directive. It stated in EDSO, (2017c), 
that ‘customers’ right to self-consumption is a positive development. Prosumers should contribute in a fair 
manner to network charges and other system costs to ensure that cross-subsidisation73 of costs, and net 
metering, is avoided. Article 15 paragraph 1 should be further amended to ensure that net metering is 
excluded by the provisions of this directive.’ 
 
REScoop adds that ‘active customers should benefit from oversight from national regulatory authorities to 
prevent discrimination and ensure regulatory barriers are removed’ (REScoop, 2017c). 
3.2.2. Smart metering systems 
Current levels of smart meter deployment  
The 3rd Energy Package set a target of 80% of total consumers being equipped with a smart metering 
system by 2020. Smart metering systems aim to support retail markets to fully deliver benefits to 
consumers and the electricity system through enabling demand response, dynamic pricing competition, 
and other energy services to evolve. 
 
The decision to roll-out smart metering systems at MS levels is subject to national cost-benefit analysis, 
resulting in different coverage choices, technical characteristics, and implementation roadmaps. Italy 
(95%), Finland (97%) and Sweden (100%) are the EU frontrunners in smart meter coverage. On the other 
hand, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Portugal and Lithuania have decided not to invest at all in smart meter 
deployment. These significant variations among the Member States are due to the uncertain cost/benefit 
of the deployment, as well as concerns about security and data protection. EC (2016i) evaluation of the 
EU Framework for metering and billing of energy consumption, a report accompanying the CEP, points out 
the relatively low penetration rate of smart meters across most MSs. It adds that this indicates the limited 
effectiveness of the provisions in the 3rd Energy Package. Note that in the majority of MSs, the DSOs are 
in charge of the procurement of smart meters except in the UK where the suppliers are in charge of the 
implementation. In Germany, the DSOs are responsible for the roll-out, as long as the respective consumer 
does not choose a third party as meter operator. 
 
According to EC, (2016e), it is projected that 72% of European consumers will be equipped with smart 
meters for electricity by 2020: 
-16 Member States: Sweden, Italy, Finland, Malta, Spain, Austria, Poland, the UK, Estonia, Romania, 
Greece, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Luxembourg, Ireland, and lately Latvia are targeting a nation-
                                                           
73 Cross-subsidisation refers to the fact that non-active customers subsidise network costs that active customers or PV-owners 
avoided paying. For more details, see chapter 4 of Pérez-Arriaga et al. (2013). 
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wide roll-out to at least 80% of customers by 2020 (with 13 of them going much beyond the target of the 
E-Directive). 
-2 Member States, Germany and Slovakia, are moving to a deployment in a selected segment of consumers 
(to max. 23% by 2020). 
-The remaining ones (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Lithuania and Portugal) have either 
decided against, at least under current conditions, or have not made a firm commitment yet for a mass-
scale or even a selective roll-out. 
 
 
Figure 20: Smart electricity metering systems roll-out status in the EU countries and Norway until 2016, source: (EC, 2018b) 
The CEP proposal for smart meter integration 
A ‘smart metering system’ according to the E-Directive is ‘an electronic system that can measure energy 
consumption, providing more information than a conventional meter, and can transmit and receive data 
for information, monitoring and control purposes, using a form of electronic communication.’ 
Incentives for Smart metering systems 
Smart metering is a key technology that allows consumers to engage in the electricity markets (recital 33 
of the E-Directive). It adds that: ‘smart metering systems empower consumers as they allow them to 
receive accurate and near-real time74 feedback on their energy consumption or generation allowing them 
to manage it better, participate in and reap benefits from demand side response programmes and other 
services, and lower their electricity bill.’ Also, with regards to DSOs, smart metering enables them to have 
better visibility of their networks. It reduces operation and maintenance costs. It could be considered as 
a sensor, which can open the ‘door’ to new services.  
 
                                                           
74 Near-real time is defined in the E-Directive in the context of smart metering, as ‘the time, usually down to seconds, that elapses 




The deployed smart meters by MSs, according to recital 36 of the E-Directive, should be ‘interoperable, 
not represent a barrier to switching of supplier, and should be equipped with fit-for-purpose functionalities 
that allow consumers to have near-real time access to their consumption data, modulate their energy 
consumption and, to the extent that the supporting infrastructure permits, offer their flexibility to the 
network and to energy services companies, be rewarded for it, and achieve savings in their electricity bill.’ 
 
The roll-out of smart metering systems in a MS may be subject to a cost-benefit analysis (CBA), as indicated 
in article 19(2). Where smart metering is positively assessed or systematically rolled out, the MS shall 
implement smart metering systems in accordance with European standards and in line with the provisions 
of Annex III on ‘Smart meters’ as well as article 20 of the E-Directive. If it is negatively assessed (negative 
CBA) and not systematically rolled out, the MS shall ensure that final customers are ‘entitled to have 
installed or, where applicable, to have upgraded, on request and under fair and reasonable conditions, a 
smart meter’, according to article 21. 
 
Positive CBA- Minimum Smart meters functionalities  
‘Member States that proceed with deployment shall adopt and publish the minimum functional and 
technical requirements for the smart metering systems to be rolled out in their territories in line with the 
provisions laid down in Article 20 and Annex III (…)’, as stated in article 19(3) of the E-Directive. These 
minimum functionalities should correspond, inter alia, to the ones listed in EC (2012) recommendations 
2012/148/EU based on best practice from CBAs for smart metering of electricity carried out in 11 MSs. 
These minimum functionalities cover:  
• Accurate, direct and near-real-time reading for the customer and third parties designated by the 
consumer, at no additional cost; 
• Provide secure system, privacy and ensure data communications protection, in compliance with 
relevant Union security legislation ensuring the highest level of cybersecurity protection; 
• Accounting for electricity injected into the grid and remote reading of meters by the operator; 
• Appropriate advice and information shall be given to final customers; 
• Enabling final customers to be metered and settled at the same time resolution as the imbalance 
period in the national market; 
• Two-way communication between the smart metering system and external networks for 
maintenance and control of the metering system; 
• Support advanced tariff systems; 
Note that article 7(4) of the E-Regulation states that imbalance settlement shall be 15 minutes in all 
control areas75 at wholesale and retail level by 1 January 2025. 
 
Also, flexibility and interoperability76 play a large role in the Commission’s proposals for promoting smart 
meter implementation. Article 19(3) adds that ‘(…) Member States shall ensure the interoperability of 
these smart metering systems as well as their connectivity with consumer energy management platforms. 
To this respect, Member States shall have due regard to the use of relevant available standards including 
those enabling interoperability, best practices and the importance of the development of the internal 
market in electricity.’ 
                                                           
75 On the balance settlement period, the Council adds a derogation or an exemption possible from the 15-min period that can be 
given by NRAs ‘in accordance with the balancing guideline adopted on the basis of Article 18 of the Regulation 714/2009.’ 
76 ‘Interoperability’, is defined in of the E-Directives in the context of smart metering, as ‘the ability of two or more energy or 
communication networks, systems, devices, applications or components to interwork, to exchange and use information in order 
to perform required functions.’ 
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Customer contributions to smart metering systems costs 
The Commission proposes that final customers contribute to the costs of smart meters in a transparent 
and non-discriminatory manner. Article 19(4) states that ‘Member States that proceed with smart 
metering deployment shall ensure that final customers contribute to the associated costs of the roll-out in 
a transparent and non-discriminatory manner. Member States shall regularly monitor this deployment in 
their territories to track the evolution of costs and benefits for the whole value chain, including the delivery 
of net benefits to consumers.’ 
 
Negative CBA – Consumers’ right to a smart meter  
When the smart metering systems deployment is negatively assessed through the CBA, a MS shall ensure 
a periodical revision of this assessment is carried-out with regard to the changes in the underlying 
assumptions and market and technology developments. The MS updated economic assessment should be 
notified to the Commission services according to article 19(5). 
 
In the case of a negative national CBA, final consumers are still entitled to have a smart meter installed, 
although they have to pay for the full costs themselves as stated in article 21 (2a). It should have 
functionalities referred to in article 20, or with a set of minimum functionalities to be defined and 
published by MSs at the national level in line with the provisions in Annex III. In this framework, the MS or 
the designated competent authority shall ensure that smart metering systems are installed ‘no later than 
three months 77after the customer's request.’ They shall also regularly, and ‘at least every two years, review 
and make publicly available the associated costs, and trace their evolution as a result of 
technology developments and potential metering system upgrades.’ 
 
The Council position on smart metering did not bring major changes. The Council E-Directive added in 
article 19(5a) that the smart metering systems’ provisions proposed in the E-Directive shall apply to future 
installations and installations replacing older smart meters. The already-installed smart metering systems, 
or for which the ‘start of work’78 has started before the date of entry into force of this Directive, may 
remain in operation over their lifetime. 
 
                                                           
77 This is changed to four months in the Council position. 
78 Start of works, according to Commission Communication 2014/C 200/01 1.3. 19 (44), means either the start of construction 
works on the investment or the first firm commitment to order equipment or another commitment that makes the investment 
irreversible, whichever is the first in time. Buying of land and preparatory works such as obtaining permits and conducting 
preliminary feasibility studies are not considered as start of works.  
Commission proposal 
-Smart meter roll-out may be subject to CBA analysis 
-Introducing the entitlement to a smart meter, in case of negative CBA, within 3 months of asking for 
one, while bearing the costs 
-Setting more concrete functionalities for smart meters 
-The imbalance settlement period to be harmonised at 15 min across Europe by 2025 
Council Position 
-For the already-installed smart metering systems, it is not mandatory to comply with the new 
functionalities and they may remain in operation over their lifetime 





Stakeholders’ positions  
EURELECTRIC, (2017b), welcomes the proposal for the smart metering systems roll-out where the national 
CBA is positive. However, it adds that ‘the proposal implies that Member States having rolled-out smart 
meters that do not comply with the outlined functionalities (defined in art. 20 and Annex III) by the time 
the legislation comes into force will need to upgrade them.’ EURELECTRIC believes however that ‘as long 
as the meters deployed corresponded to the rules in application at the time of their deployment, no 
stranded costs should arise.’ This is especially related to the functionality stating that ‘smart meters shall 
enable customers to be metered and settled at the same time as the resolution of the imbalance period in 
the national market takes place.’ (article 20(g)). 
 
The CEER (2017d) white paper recommends maintaining ‘a flexible approach to smart meter roll-out’ . It 
focuses especially on the case of negative CBA and states that ‘smart meter roll-out is a national (not 
individual customer level) decision typically taken on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis. If a Member 
State’s smart meter cost-benefit analysis is negative, an individual customer should not be entitled ‘on-
request’ to a smart meter as this is neither practical nor cost efficient.’ 
 
EDSO, (2017c) takes a similar position to EURELECTRIC with regard to the non-cost-efficient upgrade of 
the already rolled-out smart meters. It states that ‘smart meters deployment will be completed in some 
Member States by the time the Electricity Directive enters into force. Therefore, if already deployed smart 
meters were obliged to comply with all the minimum functionalities, this could result in stranded assets 
and costs may outweigh the benefits. In some member states, the switch is assessed as a device with a 
high security of supply risk at societal level, and therefore contradictory with the requirement of highest 
level of security from sub-art b.’ 
 
Wind Europe, SEDC, Solar Power Europe and other EU organisations welcome the roll-out decision of 
smart meters in the E-Directive. They state, in SEDC et al., (2017) that ‘smart metering is a pre-requisite as 
the certified basis for billing consumers using multiple tariffs for market-based pricing. It also forms the 
foundation for the development of additional consumer services’. 
 
BEUC has stated that the E-Directive should be amended to indicate that ‘where implementation of smart 
meter roll-out is assessed positively, consumers should have easy and timely access to the information on 
their consumption (i.e., near real time data defined down to seconds) so they can use this information and 
make informed decisions.’ Also ‘the roll out of smart meters should be supported by a tailored advice 
programme that ensures consumers know how to make savings from their smart meter and how far this 
is supported by their own housing type.’ It adds that ‘consumers should always have a choice to opt out 
and have their meter operated in a “dumb mode”’  (BEUC, 2017a). 
3.2.3. Data access and management 
Current practices 
With the increased roll-out of smart meters across Europe, the experience from leading MSs in this process 
shows that robust and clear rules are necessary to ensure that the full benefits of smart metering data are 
realised, and that data privacy is respected (EC, 2016e). Such rules are not fully developed in the existing 
EU legislation, and national regulations may differ from one MS to another. This may harm the interests 
of market actors involved in data handling, meaning that they are unlikely to emerge without regulatory 
intervention. For example, studies from NRAs, according to EC (2016e) indicate that discriminatory access 
to information on potential customers represents a key barrier for new entrants to retail electricity 
markets in Europe. Indeed, as most DSOs are also electricity retailers, safeguards, and market monitoring 
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are necessary to prevent them from adopting discriminatory access and management of consumer data 
(i.e., smart metering data) and gaining a competitive advantage through information asymmetry between 
them (the incumbents) and the potential new entrants. 
The CEP proposal for data access and management  
According to the EC (2016e) impact assessment, consumer data management rules should be put in place 
in Europe, and standardised national data formats – to facilitate data access – should also be 
implemented. The CEP aims to define responsibilities in data handling as well as criteria and principles to 
ensure the impartiality and non-discriminatory behaviour of entities involved in data handling. It also 
includes proposals to implement a standardised data format at the national level. Principles ensuring the 
impartiality and non-discriminatory behaviour of entities involved in data handling as well as timely and 
transparent access to data, independently from the data management model, should be applied in each 
MS. These measures aim to increase transparency, provide non-discriminatory access and enhance 
competition, while at the same time ensuring data protection. 
 
‘Member States or, where a Member State has so provided the designated competent authorities, shall 
specify the eligible parties which may have access to data of the final customer with their explicit consent’, 
according to article 23(1) of the E-Directive. ‘Data shall include metering and consumption data as well as 
data required for consumer switching. Eligible parties shall include at least 79  customers, suppliers, 
transmission and distribution system operators, aggregators, energy service companies, and other parties 
which provide energy or other services to customers.’ 
 
Article 23(2) adds that ‘Member States shall organise the management of data in order to ensure efficient 
data access and exchange. Independently of the data management model applied in each Member State, 
the party or parties responsible for data management shall provide to any eligible party with the explicit 
consent of the final customer, access to the data of the final customer.’ MSs or the designated competent 
authorities shall also authorise and certify the parties that are managing data in order to ensure that they 
comply with the requirements of the E-Directive, according to article 23(3). Article 23(4) states, regarding 
data access, that ‘no additional costs shall be charged to final customers for access to their data. Member 
States shall be responsible for setting the relevant costs for access to data by eligible parties. Regulated 
entities which provide data services shall not profit from that activity80.’ 
 
In addition to non-discriminatory data access, the Commission proposed nationally harmonised data 
formats that will also help new suppliers and service providers to enter the market and develop innovative 
new products. According to article 24 of the E-Directive, MSs shall define a common national data format 
and a transparent procedure to promote competition in the retail market and avoid excessive 
administrative costs for the eligible parties81. Later, the Commission, by means of implementing acts, shall 
determine a common European data format that will replace those national data formats. MSs shall 
ensure then that market participants apply the common European data format. 
 
In the Council position, article 24(2), the common data format, to be determined by the Commission, was 
changed into interoperability requirements and non-discriminatory procedures for accessing the data that 
will build upon existing national practices adopted by Member States. 
                                                           
79 The list of minimum eligible parties was removed in the Council position. 
80 The non-profit criteria of the data access of regulated entity has been removed in the Council position. 




EURELECTRIC agrees with the Commission proposal regarding data access and management. It states in 
EURELECTRIC, (2017b) that ‘there is no “one size fits all” data management model applicable in all 
European countries, it is however fundamental to set common principles at EU level to ensure that data 
access and exchange is done in a secure, transparent, neutral, non-discriminatory, and cost-efficient way.’ 
However as stated in their position regarding DSOs’ role in data management, EURELECTRIC claims for a 
DSO and supplier’ unrestricted access to their customers’ metering and consumption data as indicated in 
EURELECTRIC position of section 2.4.3. 
 
CEER welcomes the Commission’s proposals for a transparent procedure for eligible parties to access data 
and the final customers free of charge data access (CEER, 2017e). On data format, CEER sees a scope for 
change. It states that ‘a common European data format may generate high costs in the transition period 
from national standards to an EU standard, although it may bring long-term benefits. Before deciding on 
a common data format, energy regulators recommend a final analysis on the implications for innovation 
and retrospective compatibility. If a common European format is not required, interoperability should be 
allowed as a more cost-effective approach to facilitating retail competition between suppliers from 
different Member States.’’ 
 
EDSO also promotes a non-restricted DSOs access for all necessary data from the customers, as stated in 
its position regarding DSOs roles in data management in 2.4.3. It also states that ‘the setting-up of a 
common European data format would be very costly to implement given the heterogeneous national 
frameworks, standards, and market processes, and therefore its costs should be compared against its 
benefits. In addition, evaluate whether the common data format should be limited to a “minimum content” 
to ensure easier implementation’ (EDSO, 2017c).  
 
On data protection, BEUC has stated that the ‘compliance with the data protection framework and 
effective enforcement must be ensured. The consumer must have the right to access and control all the 
data generated by the smart meter and other smart devices at home. Each party requesting the data has 
to provide justification of why the data is needed and should access data only after the explicit consent of 
the consumer. The consumer must be able to revoke this approval at any time’ (BEUC, 2017a). 
Commission proposal 
-Setting principles ensuring the impartiality and non-discriminatory behaviour of entities involved in 
data handling and data access. 
-Consumers’ data can be shared among eligible parties with consumer consent. 
-MSs shall specify the eligible parties for access to data while respecting the minimum eligible entities. 
-MSs shall define a common national data format. Later, the Commission shall determine a common 
European data format that will replace those national data formats. 
Council Position 
-The list of minimum eligible parties was removed in the Council position. 
-The common data format, to be determined by the Commission, was changed into interoperability 
requirements and non-discriminatory procedures for data access. 
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3.2.4. Dynamic pricing 
Dynamic pricing methods in Europe  
Several dynamic pricing (DP) methods with different penetration levels among customers exist in 
Europe. The different methods depend on two main factors (ACER and CEER, 2015): 
(i) the granularity of the period during which consumption is metered separately, and 
(ii) the dynamics/statics of ToU prices.  
 
The impact on consumers depends on the combination of these two factors. They can be rewarded for 
positively reacting to price signals or penalised if not. There are three main methods applied in the EU. 
Their implementation depends on the provided enabling framework. 
• Static Time of Use (ToU): the end-user electricity price is set in advance for each fixed time band. 
It reflects the average wholesale price in the time band (low granularity-low dynamics). It can 
vary by time of day, day of week and/or season of year. Another form of ‘static ToU’, less 
common, that has high granularity-low dynamics, is where hourly consumption is priced at 
monthly average prices.  
• Critical peak pricing (CCP): a higher end-user electricity price is charged in designated and limited 
periods corresponding to consumption peak at the system level (low granularity-high dynamics)  
• Real-time pricing: the end-user electricity price is posted in real time (typically at least hourly) 
and communicated automatically to the consumer as it changes (high granularity-high 
dynamics). 
Figure 21 gives a classification of the DP methods in function of the two factors. 
 
 
Figure 21: Methods of dynamic pricing for electricity  
Dynamic Pricing in electricity supply 
Figure 22 shows the different DP methods across MSs; countries are coloured according to the main 





Figure 22: Share of standard household consumers supplied under dynamic pricing (DP), adapted from (ACER and CEER, 2015) 
ToU pricing is applied in 17 out of 22 countries whose NRAs participated in the questionnaire. The most 
commonly applied type of ToU is a day/night differentiation. However, in some countries, like Italy, the 
number of time periods of ToU tariffs can be higher (e.g., in Italy, three-time bands are set based on the 
weekdays/weekends and peak/ off-peak differentiation). Spot market-based pricing applies to a large 
share of electricity household customers in three countries (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden) through 
monthly spot-exchange prices. The hourly real-time pricing method is only used in five European 
countries: Sweden, the UK, Romania, Estonia and Spain with different penetration levels among 
households. For the latter two, between 25% and 50% of all households have access to supply tariffs based 
on hourly pricing. Critical peak pricing (CCP) applies to a smaller proportion of households in France, 
Romania, Lithuania, Portugal and the UK. 
 
In some MSs, there are multiple DP methods in use. The additional dynamic pricing methods are 
represented by the coloured dots in Figure 22. As for Spain, between 25% and 50% of households incur 
hourly real-time pricing and ToU also applies in supply to less than 25% of the households.  
The CEP proposal for dynamic contracting 
The CEP envisions the expansion of dynamic price contracts in Europe to enhance consumer 
empowerment and participation in competitive retail markets. We will present here the new provisions 
of the CEP in two parts, first, the entitlement to dynamic contracts and second the provision for dynamic 
pricing of networks. 
Customer’s entitlement and implementation monitoring 
The E-Directive defines a dynamic electricity contract as ‘an electricity supply contract between a supplier 
and a final customer that reflects the price at the spot market, including at the day ahead market at 
intervals at least equal to the market settlement frequency.’ This definition restricts dynamic pricing 
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contracts to the most granular and the most dynamic type of dynamic pricing. Thus, it excludes the static 
Time-of-Use Tariff (ToU) and the critical peak pricing (CCP). 
 
Article 11 of the E-Directive on ‘entitlement to a dynamic price contract’ states that MSs shall ensure that 
every final customer should be entitled, on request, to a dynamic electricity price contract82. Also, ‘final 
customers shall be fully informed by the suppliers of the opportunities and risks of such dynamic electricity 
price contract.83’ Moreover, MSs through their NRAs ‘shall monitor and report annually, for at least a ten-
year period after such contracts become available, on the main developments of such contracts including 
market offers, the impact on consumers' bills and specifically the level of price volatility, and on consumers' 
sensitivity to the level of financial risk.’ 
 
The Council position has changed the ten-year period for monitoring and reporting dynamic electricity 
price contracts. It proposes that it should be done where dynamic electricity price contract accounts for 
less than 80% of the electricity consumed by households instead.  
 
Dynamic pricing for network charges in the EU CEP 
Article 16(7) on ‘charges for access to networks’, focuses on distribution tariffs which shall reflect the cost 
of use of the distribution grid by system users including active customers. They can be differentiated based 
on system user characteristics and generation/consumption profiles. It adds that: ‘(…) where the EU 
Member States have implemented the deployment of smart metering systems, regulatory authorities may 
introduce “time differentiated network tariffs, reflecting the use of the network”, in a transparent and 
foreseeable way for the consumer.’ 
 
Stakeholders’ positions 
EURELECTRIC agrees with customer entitlement to dynamic contracts in its position paper (EURELECTRIC, 
(2017b) but disagrees that the supplier is obliged to offer them. It states that ‘offering dynamic electricity 
prices is also interesting for retailers as it provides them with the opportunity to reduce their hedging costs. 
There should not be any legal barriers to offer every final customer a dynamic electricity price contract if a 
customer chooses so, neither any obligation on all suppliers to offer such a product. (..) Any such obligation 
should be avoided to ensure coherence with the broader framework that advocates for complete market 
liberalisation [sic].’ 
 
                                                           
82 The Council position restricts this right to customers who have a smart meter installed.  
83 The Council adds that ‘regulatory authorities shall monitor the market developments and assess the risks that the new products 
and services may entail and modify safeguards in case of abusive practices.’ 
Commission proposal 
- A new definition of dynamic pricing that excludes less granular pricing methods 
- Mandatory dynamic pricing offerings from electricity suppliers 
- Annual monitoring of DP contracts by NRAs for at least ten years is required 
- Incentivising the introduction of dynamic time differentiated network tariffs 
Council position 
- Annual DP monitoring to be done where dynamic electricity price contract accounts for less than 80% 





EURELECTRIC adds that ‘the proposed annual NRA report should also analyse the combined impact on 
consumers' bills of dynamic pricing and sales and purchases from an aggregation contract that customers 
may sign in parallel.’ 
 
CEER also states that ‘Member States should ensure that suppliers do not face any undue barriers if they 
choose to offer dynamic price contracts to customers. However, suppliers should not be obliged through 
EU legislation to offer dynamic price contracts as this could hinder retail competition, ultimately harming 
consumers. Furthermore, the definition of a dynamic price contract should be reassessed.’ 
 
CEDEC also supports the idea not to oblige suppliers to offer dynamic contracts in (CEDEC, 2017). It states 
that ‘given the cost for a supplier to develop such an offer, the right should be optional. Also, the right 
should not be explicitly limited to his current supplier, in order to let the market function most efficiently 
and to stimulate market development in this field.’ 
 
BEUC adds that ‘in case of dynamic price contracts, the contract as well as the summary of key contractual 
conditions should contain clear guidance and warnings explaining the financial risk of such contracts’ 
(BEUC, 2017a). 
3.3. Market entry for new customer intermediaries 
Two customer market intermediaries, aggregators and local energy communities, are defined in the CEP 
with provisions on their regulatory framework, roles, and duties aiming to group the energy generation or 
consumption of several consumers.  
3.3.1. Aggregators 
The landscape of electricity aggregators  
An aggregator is an energy service provider which can change the electricity consumption of a group of 
electricity consumers and provide demand-side flexibility to the grid. Aggregation can be carried out by 
traditional energy service providers such as suppliers, or by new entrants such as independent 
aggregators. In practice, when consumers engage with an independent aggregator, they have one contract 
with the supplier and a separate one with the aggregator. 
 
In European markets, there are few examples of independent electricity aggregators engaging with 
residential consumers. The existing aggregators mainly work with large industrial or commercial 
customers. However, with the emergence of consumer empowering new technologies and the adequate 
regulatory framework, residential flexible electricity consumption will become more commercially 
attractive for aggregators and vice-versa, (BEUC, 2018b). Figure 23 illustrates the access of independent 




Figure 23: Aggregators’ access to markets, source: (SEDC, 2017) 
According to SEDC, (2017), the MSs that currently provide the most supportive framework for the 
development of demand response and aggregation are Switzerland, France, Belgium, Finland, the UK, and 
Ireland. Nevertheless, there are still regulatory issues that exist in these well-performing MSs.  
 
Switzerland84 and France85 have put in place detailed frameworks for independent aggregation, including 
the standardised roles and duties of market participants. In Belgium, an upcoming legislation addressing 
the role of the aggregator and independent aggregation will soon be put in place. Spain, Portugal and 
Estonia are in red in Figure 23, because aggregated demand-side flexibility is either not accepted as a 
resource in any of the electricity markets or it is not yet regulatory viable. Italy is also in red, however, a 
partial opening of balancing markets to aggregators is occurring in 2018 (Bertoldi et al., 2017). 
 
Independent aggregators and electricity suppliers can have opposing interests due to their type of activity; 
the former sell flexibility while the latter sell electricity. In most MSs, but not all, an aggregator needs 
permission from the supplier to access the supplier’s consumers and therefore may prevent the 
aggregator from contracting with their customers. 
The CEP proposal for aggregators  
The CEP aims to establish a regulatory framework clarifying the roles and responsibilities of aggregators 
and lifting the barriers impeding independent aggregators from entering the market. 
  
Article 2(14) of the E-Directive defines an ‘aggregator’ as ‘a market participant that combines multiple 
customers loads or generated electricity for sale, for purchase or auction in any organised energy market’. 
It can be considered as an independent aggregator, according to article 2(15), if it ‘is not affiliated to a 
supplier or any other market participant’. 
                                                           
84 Switzerland opened its market to aggregated Demand Response after certain regulatory changes in 2013 (SEDC, 2017). 
85 In France, large industrial customers have been participating in balancing mechanisms since 2003. The provision of FCR by 
industrial customers started in 2014. Furthermore, demand was allowed to participate in automatic FRR since July 2014, and in 
the day ahead and intraday markets from January 2017 (SEDC, 2017). 
71 
 
Consumers’ right for aggregator contracting 
Article 13 of the E-Directive on ‘contract with an aggregator’ gives the right for aggregators to enter the 
market without consent from other market participants. It also sets contracting rules between final 
customers and aggregators. For instance, MS shall ensure that final customers’ engagement with an 
aggregator ‘shall not require the consent of the final customer's supplier.’ 
 
Also, final customers contract termination with aggregators, while respecting contractual conditions, 
should be done within three weeks. If a fixed contract termination by final customers happens before its 
maturity, they should not be charged any termination fee that ‘exceeds the direct economic loss to the 
aggregator, including the cost of any bundled investments or services already provided to the final 
customer as part of the contract. 86 ’ Article 13(4) adds that ‘Member States shall ensure that final 
customers are entitled to receive all relevant demand response data or data on supplied and sold electricity 
at least once per year.’ These rights regarding aggregators’ contracts shall be granted to final customers 
in a non-discriminatory manner with regards to cost, effort or time. 
 
The Council position states on suppliers’ consent in article 13(1), that MSs may allow suppliers to require 
such consent only in cases where the customer's supplier neither receives a regulated compensation 
payment, in line with article 17(3)(db) of the Council E-Directive, nor a compensation for positive 
imbalances87 and the need for the supplier’s consent is clearly specified in the contract between the 
customer and his supplier. 
 
Rules for aggregators market participation  
Article 17 of the E-Directive requires MSs to ensure demand response participation, from active customers 
directly, or through aggregation, in all organised electricity markets. It states that all MSs shall introduce 
a conducive legal framework for demand response aggregators to foster market participation of DR, 
including through independent aggregators while defining the relevant roles and responsibilities. 
Moreover, it adds that MSs shall ensure that TSOs and DSOs, when procuring ancillary services, treat 
demand response providers, including independent aggregators, in a non-discriminatory manner, on the 
basis of their technical capabilities. 
 
To encourage aggregators’ participation, article 17(3) states that MS national regulatory framework 
should provide to the aggregators the right to enter the market without consent from other market 
participants. Also, it should ensure that ‘aggregators shall not be required to pay compensation to 
suppliers or generators.’ In paragraph (4), the article indicates that Member States may exceptionally 
determine a compensation by the aggregator to BRPs. This happens exceptionally in ‘situations where one 
market participant induces imbalances to another market participant resulting in a financial cost. Such 
exceptional compensation payments shall be subject to approval by the national regulatory authorities 
and monitored by the Agency.’ 
 
The Council position states, on aggregators’ financial responsibilities in article 17(3)(da), that ‘market 
participants engaged in aggregation shall be financially responsible for the imbalances they cause in the 
electricity system. To this extent they shall be balance responsible parties or shall delegate their balance 
responsibility in accordance with Art 4 of the electricity Regulation.’ It adds that MS may require 
independent aggregators to pay compensation to other market participants or their BRPs if they directly 
induce imbalances to these market participants. 
                                                           
86 This statement was removed in the Council position. 





EURELECTRIC, (2017b) fully supports ‘the objective that generation, storage and demand response should 
compete on a level-playing field, including non-discriminatory participation of aggregators in the market.’ 
However, it adds that ‘the newly introduced definitions in Art. 2 for “independent 
aggregator”/”aggregators” need clarification as the intention of this distinction and its consequences are 
unclear. (…) “aggregators” and “independent aggregators” should not be exempted from rules applicable 
to other market participants, including balance responsibility.’ 
 
CEER & ACER recognise ‘the benefits of introducing independent aggregation and propose that MSs enable 
independent aggregation unless a national implementation assessment suggests an alternative that better 
serves system efficiency and can be implemented effectively. Such an assessment might be supported by 
an analysis of the state of competition in MSs’ retail markets. This reflects a focus on the facilitation of 
aggregation (the activity), rather than aggregator type (the agent)’, (ACER and CEER, 2017c). 
 
ENTSO-E welcomes the Commission proposal on aggregators. However, it believes that ‘the absence of 
financial compensation between aggregators and suppliers or generators will create balancing market 
inefficiencies and could result in undue distortion of market incentives and competition. As a consequence, 
the overall development of implicit and explicit demand response would be put at stake.’ It adds that ‘each 
market party should be financially compensated for the energy it has sourced and which has been 
transferred to another market party’s balancing perimeter’ (ENTSO-E, 2017d). 
 
SEDC, (2017) also calls for a clarification of the relationship between retailers, BRPs, and independent 
aggregators to allow for a fair competition between market parties. It adds that ‘standardised frameworks 
and processes should be put in place to enable the smooth functioning of the market’. 
3.3.2. Local Energy Communities 
Landscape of local energy communities  
The past decade or so has seen the emergence of increasing numbers of local energy cooperatives, 
through citizen initiatives, which produce and supply themselves with clean, renewable energy, and this 
trend is likely to continue in the future. They may be gathering a number of household consumers on a 
small scale or may be much more structured in larger local energy communities. Figure 24 gives an 
overview of the energy communities in Europe. 
 
Commission proposal 
-Introducing a conducive legal framework for DR aggregators to foster market participation. 
-Aggregators can participate in the market without consent from other market participants i.e., 
customers’ supplier. 
-Final customers contract termination with aggregators should be done within three weeks. 
Council Position 
-MSs may allow suppliers to require their consent in some cases. 
-Market participants engaged in aggregation shall be financially responsible for the imbalances they 




Figure 24: European groups or cooperatives of citizens working on renewable energy, energy efficiency, and e-mobility, 
source: (REScoop, 2018) 
Recently citizen cooperatives have started looking at taking back the electricity grids as well. The most 
known example is the one of Hamburg, where citizens voted to buy back the distribution grid from 
Vattenfall in early 2014. A similar campaign had failed in Berlin, however, the question of buying back the 
grid there has not yet been completely resolved (EC, 2015d).  
 
The drivers for energy communities are not just the benefits from competitive energy prices and 
investment returns. Energy communities are also driven by citizens’ willingness to work against 
monopolies by cooperating with their neighbours and their desire to fight climate change with a social 
and renewable focus. 
 
EU citizens have started investing in local energy communities and especially renewable energy 
cooperatives in countries like Spain, Croatia, France and Greece. However, different legal frameworks and 
lack of effective support mechanisms have prevented those countries from keeping up with the more 
developed energy community countries of the north, such as the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, 
Germany and Belgium (EC, 2015d). 
The CEP proposal for Local Energy Communities  
According to the E-Directive, a ‘local energy community’ means: ‘an association, a cooperative, a 
partnership, a non-profit organisation or other legal entity which is effectively controlled by local 
shareholders or members, generally value rather than profit-driven, involved in distributed generation and 
performing activities of a distribution system operator, supplier or aggregator at local level, including 
across borders.’ The CEP recognises local energy communities as a critical enabler for encouraging the 
involvement of the individual in the development of the electricity sector and requires from member 




Recital 30 of the E-Directive, states that ‘(…) Local energy communities should be allowed to operate on 
the market on a level-playing field without distorting competition. Household consumers should be allowed 
to voluntarily participate in a community energy initiative as well as to leave it, without losing access to 
the network operated by the community energy initiative or their rights as consumers. Access to a local 
energy community's network should be granted on fair and cost-reflective terms.’ 
 
MSs adopt a legal framework for the establishment of local energy communities (article 16 of the E-
Directive). They should ensure that LECs are entitled ‘to own, establish, or lease community networks and 
to autonomously manage them.’ They shall also access all organised electricity markets either directly or 
indirectly (through aggregators or suppliers) in a non-discriminatory manner, as shown in Error! Reference s
ource not found., (Butenko, 2017b). LECs should additionally be ‘subject to fair, proportionate and 
transparent procedures and cost-reflective charges.’ 
 
The LECs enabling regulatory framework should provide voluntary participation in these communities and 
guarantee individual rights for their shareholders or members. On grid operation, when LECs perform 
distribution network activities, they are subject to the same provisions as the DSOs, included in chapter IV 
of the E-Directive. They may also, where relevant, conclude an agreement with a DSO, to which their 
network is connected, for the operation of the LEC’s network, subject to cost-reflective network charges.  
 
According to article 16(2)(g), if an LEC consumes electricity from an external network, it will be subject to 
‘appropriate network charges’, which must account separately for the electricity fed and taken from the 
grid. Given that these measures will be contained in a Directive, this may leave further space for MSs for 
adopting national measures for LECs. Indeed, there are some areas that are still not clear, such as LECs 
licencing procedure, possible concentration or size requirements with regards to LECs diverse roles 
(Butenko, 2017b). 
Table 5: EU CEP impact on LECs' Market Access, adapted from (Butenko, 2017b) 
 
 
The Council position divides the framework of LECs to be established by MSs into two parts: a mandatory 
one as stated in article 16(1) concerning the enabling regulatory framework to be provided by MSs for the 
open and voluntary participation in LECs, its members rights as well as DSOs relation with energy 
communities’ compensation and procedures regarding the overall cost sharing of the system. 
 
The second part regards cross-border participation, distribution network management and the 
community sharing of self-generated electricity. Article 16(2) of the Council position states that MSs may 
provide in the enabling regulatory framework that LECs are open to cross-border participation as well as 
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the right to own, manage, establish, purchase or lease the distribution network in their area of operation 




EURELECTRIC, (2017b) states regarding the provisions on LECs, that ‘any kind of positive discrimination of 
energy communities at the expense of other consumers and actors in the energy system must be avoided’’. 
It adds that LECs ‘should not be exempted from market obligations such as balancing responsibility and 
from paying cost-reflective network charges.’ 
 
CEER, (2017e) has indicated that the definition of LECs should be refined. It states that the ‘participation 
in local energy communities should be strictly voluntary; shareholders/members of local energy 
communities must not lose their rights as household or active customers, including the right to leave the 
local energy community and thereby switch suppliers quickly; and legal responsibility must remain with 
such communities even when management is delegated to a third party.’ 
 
CEER strongly supports the fact that LECs ‘are subject to appropriate network charges at the connection 
points between the community network and the distribution network outside the energy community.’ It 
adds that ‘such network charges shall account separately for the electricity fed into the distribution 
network and the electricity consumed from the distribution network outside the local energy community 
in line with Article 59 (8).’ 
 
EDSO, (2017d) suggests that some rights and obligations of LECs could be potentially contradictory. It 
states that ‘the entire electricity system is built on the strict separation between regulated (network 
operators) and unregulated (supply). It is questionable that the Directive seems to allow LECs to be both 
at the same time.’ It proposes that ‘if LECs are involved in (regulated) grid activities, conditions must apply 
in the same way to LECs as to the DSOs, which includes compliance with unbundling rules.’ 
 
REScoop, (2017c) position paper on LECs states that the definition of a LEC ‘should clearly specify the 
characteristics that distinguish a LEC from traditional public and commercial energy companies, and 
acknowledge equally all the activities that LECs engage in throughout the power sector’. It should include 
open, or non-exclusive, economic participation of all potential local shareholders, direct democratic 
governance based on equal decision-making rights. REScoop also adds that LECs’ definition should reduce 
the emphasis on the link to distribution system operation as the E-Directive definition might be 
interpreted as presenting LECs as DSOs. Moreover, REScoop states that the role of LECs in addressing 
energy poverty, particularly in national energy action plans, should be better acknowledged. 
Commission proposal 
-A definition of Local Energy Communities having access to different electricity markets 
-Ensuring the possibility for LECs to establish, own, and autonomously manage networks as well as to 
purchase and sell electricity directly or through aggregators. 
-LECs should be subject to appropriate network charges for the electricity consumed from an 
external network 
Council position 
- The Council has given freedom to MSs to allow or not energy communities’ openness for cross 
border participation as well as for the right to own, manage, establish, purchase or lease the 




BEUC adds that ‘local communities should be granted a simplified access to wholesale markets. Exemptions 
regarding market access for local renewable energy communities should be granted to facilitate 
consumers’ engagement in energy markets’. It also indicates that ‘whenever communities act as 
aggregators, for instance by selling self-generated solar electricity to tenants, tenants should always be 
able to decide if they want to participate in this scheme and therefore, contractual relationships should be 
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